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BE THEY FISH OR NOT FISH: THE FISHY REGISTRATION OF
NONSEXUAL OFFENDERS
Ofer Raban*
A "Fish" means any creature of the sea, be it fish or not fish.'
A "Sex crime" means . . . Kidnapping in the first degree if the
victim was under 18 years of age.2
INTRODUCTION
In 1989, Wing Dong Moi, an eighteen-year-old member of a Manhattan China-
town gang, pled guilty to kidnapping in the second degree in a case involving the
murder of two rival gang members.3 The two victims, ages fifteen and sixteen, were
taken off an ice-skating rink, pushed into a car, driven to Westchester County (which
adjoins New York City) and, a few hours later, were shot dead-apparently at the
orders of the gang leader.4 Moi claimed that he only helped put the victims in the
car, that he was not involved in any of the subsequent events, and that he was not
aware that the victims would be killed.5 The prosecution agreed to a kidnapping plea
(a plea consistent with Moi's claims), and Moi was sentenced to two to six-and-a-
half years in prison.6 He was released from prison in 1991.7
In 1996, Moi was notified that he was required to register as a "level three" (highest
risk) sex offender for life under New York's newly enacted Sex Offender Registration
Act (SORA).8 The Act defined the kidnapping of a victim less than seventeen years
of age as a sex offense.9 Moi became a registered sex offender.'°
* Visiting Professor, University of Utah S.J. Quinney College of Law, Assistant
Professor of Law, University of Detroit Mercy School of Law. D.Phil., Oxford University;
J.D., Harvard Law School; B.A., City College of New York. I would like to thank Professor
Lee Goldman for his helpful comments and my two research assistants, Tim Chervenak and
Ben McMartin for their hard work and professionalism.
' Fishery, Executive Order, Chapter 69, Section 6 (1937) (Isr.).
2 OR. REV. STAT. § 181.594 (2007).







9 N.Y. CORRECT. LAW § 168(a) (McKinney 1996).
10 Moi, 2005 WL 1618124, at *1.
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On June 2, 2004, the Legal Aid Society of New York and New York State reached
an agreement regarding procedural due process violations in the classification of New
York's sex offenders." Soon thereafter, Moi-who had no further encounters with
the law-received a letter telling him he was entitled to a re-determination of his level
three sex offender status.' 2 But Moi's new attorney, having looked at the facts of the
case, was not content to challenge only Moi's classification: she filed papers claim-
ing that registering Moi-a nonsexual criminal-as a sex offender was a violation
of the Constitution. 3 The position of the Westchester District Attorney's Office was
that Moi was properly registered as a level three sex offender.'
4
Moi died of a heart attack a few weeks before a court found his sex offender
registration unconstitutional:
There is simply no rational basis for requiring Defendant to
register every 30 days with his local police department as a level
three sex offender.... [and] having Defendant's photo placed
on the internet in an effort to protect the community by notifying
it that Defendant is a sex offender when Defendant has not
committed any offense with a sexual component. 5
But the legal issue presented in Moi is far from settled. One year after the case
was decided, another New York court reached the opposite conclusion, holding that
the sex offender registration of a nonsexual criminal was perfectly constitutional and
slamming Moi for "fail[ing] to take into account that it is for the Legislature, not the
judiciary, to determine whether making kidnapping and unlawful imprisonment of a
minor subject to SORA (Sexual Offender Registration Act) serves the public interest." 6
Courts across the nation are equally divided on the constitutionality of registering
" See Doe v. Pataki, 427 F. Supp. 2d 398, 400-04 (S.D.N.Y. 2006) (providing that
certain levels of sex offenders had a "right to redetermination of their risk level").
12 Moi, 2005 WL 1618124, at *1.
'3 Id.
'4 See id. By way of disclosure: I was asked to press this claim as an Assistant District
Attorney in the Westchester County Appeals and Special Litigation Division. Working on
the file, I soon discovered that Moi's level three classification was not sound; moreover, the
constitutional claims had substantial merit and were also supported by a lower court
case-though that court committed a number of mistakes in its constitutional analysis. I re-
commended that Moi be offered a different classification, which would have terminated his
sex offender registration soon thereafter. When my recommendation was rejected I asked
to be removed from the case-a request that was graciously granted.
'5 Id. at *11.
16 People v. Cintron, 827 N.Y.S.2d 445, 460 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2006).
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offenders like Moi."7 Disagreements abound not only among different jurisdictions,
but-as in New York-within jurisdictions.' 8
This Article argues that the ongoing practice of registering criminals like Moi
as sex offenders violates the Due Process Clauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth
Amendments. The practice is also a textbook example of negligent policymaking
supported by faulty data and upheld by often poor judicial reasoning. Section I
provides a brief introduction to the Jacob Wetterling Act, the federal statute which
precipitated the enactment of sex offender registration acts by the states and which
required the registration of certain nonsexual offenders. Section II discusses the
Due Process Clause and the constitutional scrutiny it entails. Section III explains
the "liberty" interest involved in the due process claim of sex offender registrants.
17 Courts have disagreed on every conceivable constitutional issue involved. Some
found a Due Process Clause violation. See Branch v. Collier, No. Civ.A. 302CV0021-BF,
2004 WL 942194, at *8 (N.D. Tex. Apr. 30, 2004); State v. Robinson, 873 So. 2d 1205, 1216
(Fla. 2004); People v. Johnson, 843 N.E.2d 434, 440 (Ill. App. Ct. 2006), rev'd, in 870
N.E.2d 415 (2007); People v. Bell, 778 N.Y.S.2d 837, 850 (Sup. Ct. 2003); State v. Small,
No. 04AP-316,2005 WL 1785124, at *2, *5 (Ohio Ct. App. July 28,2005); State v. Gooden,
No. 82621,2004 WL 1172074, at* 10 (Ohio Ct. App. May 27,2004); State v. Barksdale, No.
19294, 2003 WL 77115, at *5 (Ohio Ct. App. Jan. 10, 2003); State v. Reine, No. 19157,
2003 WL 77174, at *5 (Ohio Ct. App. Jan. 10, 2003). Many courts rejected the Due Process
Clause challenge. See Gunderson v. Hvass, 339 F.3d 639, 645 (8th Cir. 2003), cert. denied,
540 U.S. 1124 (2004); People v. Woodard, 854 N.E.2d 674, 691-92 (Ill. App. Ct. 2006);
People v. Beard, 851 N.E.2d 141,148 (Ill. App. Ct. 2006); In re Phillip C., 847 N.E.2d 801,
809 (Ill. App. Ct. 2006); Cintron, 827 N.Y.S.2d at 860; People v. Fuller, 756 N.E.2d 255,
260 (Ill. App. Ct. 2001); State v. Sakobie, 598 S.E.2d 615, 618 (N.C. Ct. App. 2004); State
v. Bowman, No. 02AP-1025, 2003 WL 22290183, at *7 (Ohio Ct. App. Oct. 7,2003). Some
courts found an Equal Protection Clause violation. See Raines v. State, 805 So. 2d 999,
1002-03 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2001); Bell, 778 N.Y.S.2d at 850; State v. Washington, No. 99-
L-015, 2001 WL 1415568, at 3-4 (Ohio Ct. App. Nov. 14, 2001). Some courts rejected the
Equal Protection Clause claim. See Williams v. Ballard, No. 3-02-cv-0270-m, 2004 WL
1499457, at *7 (N.D. Tex. June 18, 2004); Woodard, 854 N.E.2d at 692-93; Beard, 851
N.E.2d at 150; Cintron, 827 N.Y.S.2d at 460; Bowman, 2003 WL 22290183, at *9. Some
found both Due Process Clause and Equal Protection Clause violations. See Bell, 778
N.Y.S.2d at 850; Washington, 2001 WL 1415568, at *3-*4. Still other courts found the
Equal Protection Clause wholly inapplicable to the case and refused to even consider it. See
Robinson, 873 So.2d at 1209; Johnson, 843 N.E.2d at 439. One court even prohibited the
practice as a matter of statutory construction-a holding later overruled by the Supreme
Court of New Jersey. See In re Registrant T.T., 907 A.2d 416, 424 (N.J. 2006); In re
Registrant T.S., 834 A.2d 419, 424 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2003).
18 Compare Bell, 778 N.Y.S.2d at 850 (finding due process and equal protection
violations), with Cintron, 827 N.Y.S.2d at 860 (rejecting a due process challenge); compare
Johnson, 843 N.E.2d at 439 (finding a due process violation), with Beard, 851 N.E.2d at 150
(rejecting a due process challenge and an equal protection claim); compare Bowman, 2003
WL 22290183, at *7 (rejecting a due process challenge), with Barksdale, 2003 WL 77115,
at *5 (finding a due process violation).
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Section IV argues that the registration of nonsexual offenders in sex offender registries
must be subjected to strict constitutional scrutiny-a test that it fails. Section V
explains why registration of nonsexual offenders in sex offender registries also fails
the laxer "rational basis" test. And Section VI concludes with a discussion of the pos-
sible constitutional remedies to this unconstitutional practice.
I. THE JACOB WETTERLING ACT
On October 22, 1989, in St. Joseph, Minnesota, a masked man wielding a gun
emerged from a driveway and ordered three boys to get off their bikes and lie face
down on the ground.' 9 He asked the boys for their ages, and then ordered two of
them to get up and run away, saying he would shoot if they looked back.20 Eleven-
year-old Jacob Wetterling remained behind and was never seen again.2' Two months
later, a man whose description matched that of the gunman molested a twelve-year-
old boy approximately ten miles from the location of Jacob's disappearance.22
Five years later, in 1994, the U.S. Congress passed the Jacob Wetterling Crimes
Against Children and Sexually Violent Offender Registration Program (hereinafter
Jacob Wetterling Act or the Act).23 Among other things, the Act established a national
sex offender registry where offenders convicted of certain specified offenses were
to register.24 Offenses triggering the registration requirement were divided into two
categories: "sexually violent offense[s]" and "criminal offense[s] against a victim
who is a minor. '25 Among the offenses listed under the latter heading were two
"9 Richard Meryhew, Hope Keeps Search for Jacob Going, STAR TRB. (Minneapolis),
Oct. 22, 1999, at lB.
20 Id.
21 id.
22 Richard Meryhew, Assault Victim Hopes His Story Will Lead to Break in Wetterling
Case, STAR TRIB. (Minneapolis), May 7, 2004, at 3B.
23 42 U.S.C.A. § 14071 (West Supp. 2007). Proposed legislation would amend this
provision while maintaining the registration of nonsexual criminals that constitutes the
subject matter of this Article. Pub. L. No. 109-248, 120 Stat. 600; see H.R. REP. No. 104-
555, at 2 (1996), reprinted in 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. 980, 981. Jacob's mother, Patty
Wetterling, tirelessly advocated for the Act and later became herself a candidate for
Congress in 2004 and 2006. See Bill Salisbury, Wetterling a Stronger Candidate, She Says
She Won't Runfor 6th District Congressional Seat, ST. PAUL PIONEER PRESS, Apr. 20, 2005,
at B14. Patty Wetterling was the Democratic-Farmer-Labor Party candidate in 2004 and
2006 for the Minnesota Sixth District seat in the United States House of Representatives. She
lost both races. Id.
24 See 42 U.S.C.A. § 14071(b)(2). Sex offender registration lists were not a new idea:
California enacted the nation's first registration law in 1947. See BILLLoCKYER, CAL. ATr'y
GEN., 2002 REPORT TO THE CALIFORNIA LEGISLATURE ON CALIFORNIA SEX OFFENDER
INFORMATION (2002), available at http://org.ca.gov/megan/pdf/ca-sexoff_0702.pdf.
25 42 U.S.C.A. § 1407 1(a)(3)(A)-(B).
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nonsexual offenses: "kidnapping of a minor, except by a parent" and "false impris-
onment of a minor, except by a parent."26
The Act required states to establish sex offender registries within three years as
a condition for receiving federal funds.27 Compliance with the Act necessitates regi-
stration of criminal offenses which are "comparable to or which exceed[] the
following [specified] range of offenses., 2' The distinction between sexual and non-
sexual offenses plays no part in the called-for state registries, which are simply re-
ferred to as "sexual offender registration program[s]. 29 Within two years of the
enactment of the Jacob Wetterling Act, sex offender registries were established in
all fifty states,30 and nonsexual criminals became registrable sex offenders. 3' Shortly
thereafter, Congress expanded the Act by mandating the public dissemination of the
personal details of registered offenders.32
II. THE DUE PROCESS CLAUSE: A (CRITICAL) OVERVIEW OF
DUE PROCESS DOCTRINE
The Fifth Amendment forbids the federal government to deprive any person of
"life, liberty, or property without due process of law."33 The Fourteenth Amendment's
26 Id. § 14071(a)(3)(A)(i)-(ii).
27 Id. § 14071(g)(1)-(2) (providing that if a state fails to create a registry within three
years of its enactment, the state loses ten percent of its federal crime control grant funds).
Additionally, states that create sex offender registries are awarded grants to offset the costs
of complying with the registration program. Id. § 14071(i)(l)(A). The DOJ reviews each
program, and must certify it as compliant. Id. § 1407 1(g).
28 Id. § 14071(a)(3)(A).
29 See id. § 14072(a)(3) ("[T]he term 'minimally sufficient sexual offender registration
program' means any State sexual offender registration program .... "); id. § 14072(g)(3) ("A
person required to register under subsection (c) of this section or under a State sexual
offender registration program, including a program established under section 14071 of this
title .... ).
30 See People v. Ross, 646 N.Y.S.2d 249,250 n. 1 (Sup. Ct. 1996), for a list of registration
acts by state.
" Some states expanded the number of nonsexual registrable offenses to include:
homicide, including negligent homicide if the victim is under the age of twelve; unlawful
restraint; permitting child abuse; assault if the victim is under the age of twelve; negligently
causing bodily injury if the victim is under the age of twelve; threatening to commit any
crime of violence or act dangerous to human life if the victim is under the age of twelve; and
removal of a child from state in violation of custody decree. See, e.g., ARK. CODE ANN. § 12-
12-903(12)(A)(s) (West 2007); N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-32-15 (1 )-(2) (2007). Some of these
nonsexual registrable offenses are misdemeanors. See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 54-
250(2) (West 2007) (mandating the sex offender registration of those convicted of Unlawful
Restraint in the Second Degree, a Class A Misdemeanor).
32 42 U.S.C.A. § 1407 1(e)(2).
3 U.S. CONST. amend. V.
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Due Process Clause extends an identical constitutional requirement to the states.'
The Due Process Clause has a procedural prong, which deals with the extent of the
legal process that is due, and a substantive prong, which places substantive
limitations on governmental powers no matter the extent of the accorded
procedures.35 When examining a substantive due process claim, courts must first
determine whether the claim involves a "fundamental right."36 If it does, the chal-
lenged regulation will be invalidated unless "narrowly tailored to serve a compel-
ling state interest. '37 If it does not, it is sufficient if the regulation has "a reasonable
relation to a legitimate state interest. '38 Thus, the recognition of a fundamental right
changes the nature of the inquiry from one merely demanding a rational relationship
between the means employed and a legitimate end,39 to one insisting that the regu-
lation be supported by a compelling reason and that it not sweep too broadly.4 This
difference has immense significance in practice, as strict scrutiny has often proven
fatal while the rational basis test has often been branded a rubber stamp.4'
A. Fundamental Rights
The test for determining whether a right is fundamental inquires whether the
right is "'deeply rooted in this Nation's history and tradition' ... and 'implicit in the
concept of ordered liberty,' such that 'neither liberty nor justice would exist if they
were sacrificed."' 42 Recognized fundamental rights include: the right to privacy;
the right to travel; the right to marry; and the right of parents to make decisions
regarding the procreation, care, custody, and control of their children.43
3 Id. amend. XIV.
3 See, e.g., Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327, 337 (1986).
36 See, e.g., Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374, 383 (1978).
37 See, e.g., Reno v. Flores, 507 U.S. 292, 302 (1993).
38 Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 722 (1997).
'9 See, e.g., FCC v. Beach Comm'n, Inc., 508 U.S. 307, 313 (1993).
o Legislative enactments affecting fundamental rights must be narrowly tailored to serve
a compelling state interest. See, e.g., Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 485 (1965);
Aptheker v. Sec'y of State, 378 U.S. 500, 508 (1964); Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S.
296, 307-08 (1940).
41 See, e.g., Gerald Gunther, Foreword: In Search of Evolving Doctrine on a Changing
Court: A Model for a Newer Equal Protection, 86 HARV. L. REv. 1, 8 (1972).
42 Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 720-21 (citations omitted); see also Palko v. Connecticut,
302 U.S. 319, 325-26 (1937), overruled on other grounds, Benton v. Maryland, 395 U.S.
784 (1969).
41 See, e.g., Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 753 (1982) (recognizing the fundamental
right of parents to rear their children); Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374 (1978) (recognizing
a fundamental right to marry); Griswold, 381 U.S. at 485 (recognizing a fundamental right to
privacy); Kent v. Dulles, 357 U.S. 116, 125 (1958) (recognizing a fundamental right to travel).
[Vol. 16:497
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Due process fundamental rights are hard to come by these days. Recent de-
cades have seen a Supreme Court "extremely reluctant to breathe still further sub-
stantive content into the Due Process Clause." This reluctance finds its expression,
among other things, in the requirement that any alleged fundamental right be
"carefully described"-which often means that the alleged right receives a highly
specific and narrow articulation. 45  For example, in the notorious Bowers v.
Hardwick,46 which upheld a gender-neutral criminal sodomy law challenged by a
homosexual, the Supreme Court described the asserted right not as the right to auto-
nomy or privacy in the bedroom, but as the right of "homosexuals to engage in
sodomy. 47 Similarly, in Michael H. v. Gerald D.,48 which involved the claim of a
biological father to a determination of biological parenthood as a step toward estab-
lishing visitation rights to a child residing with her biological mother and the
mother's husband, the Court described the asserted right not as a right in a parental
relationship, but as the right of a natural father to "substantive parental rights to...
a child conceived within, and born into, an extant marital union that wishes to embrace
the child."' 9 Once an asserted constitutional right is defined so narrowly and in such
peculiar a manner, it is only to be expected that evidence for its presence in American
tradition be sparse.50 It is unsurprising that the test has proven difficult to satisfy.5'
Yet, this constitutional test-as was cogently argued in Justice Brennan's lengthy
dissent in Michael H.-was not only a radical break from precedent, where funda-
mental rights were often described in broad terms and in reference to universal
values, but also was a test that rendered the Constitution "a stagnant, archaic, hide-
bound document steeped in the prejudices and superstitions of a time long past."52
It was also a test that assumed that "the only purpose of the Due Process Clause is
' Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110, 122 (1989) (Scalia, J., plurality opinion) (citing
Moore v. East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494,544 (1977) (White, J., dissenting)); see also Bowers
v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 194-95 (1986) ("Nor are we inclined to take a more expansive
view of our authority to discover new fundamental rights imbedded in the Due Process
Clause.... There should be, therefore, great resistance to expand the substantive reach of
those Clauses, particularly if it requires redefining the category of rights deemed to be
fundamental."), overruled by Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003).
"4 See, e.g., Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 721-22; Reno v. Flores, 507 U.S. 292, 302 (1993);
Collins v. Harker Heights, 503 U.S. 115, 125 (1992); Cruzan v. Dir. Mo. Dep't. of Health,
497 U.S. 261, 277-78 (1990).
' Bowers, 478 U.S. 186.
47 Id. at 190.
48 Michael H., 491 U.S. 110.
49 Id. at 127.
'o See Bowers, 478 U.S. 186.
' For an excellent criticism of existing substantive due process doctrine and the
suggestion of an alternative conceptual framework, see Lee Goldman, The Constitutional
Right to Privacy, 84 DENV. U. L. REv. 601 (2006).
52 Michael H., 491 U.S. at 140-41 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
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to confirm the importance of interests already protected," thereby "[tiransforming
the protection afforded by the Due Process Clause into a redundancy. ' 53 Previous
due process decisions, said Brennan, were very different:
Surely the use of contraceptives by unmarried couples, or even
by married couples, the freedom from corporal punishment in
schools, the freedom from an arbitrary transfer from a prison to
a psychiatric institution, and even the right to raise one's natural
but illegitimate children, were not "interest[s] traditionally
protected by our society," at the time of their consideration by
this Court. If we had asked, therefore, in Eisenstadt, Griswold,
Ingraham, Vitek, or Stanley itself whether the specific interest
under consideration had been traditionally protected, the answer
would have been a resounding "no. ' '54
The insistence on historical support and a "careful description" of the asserted
right apparently derived from the wish to curb judicial discretion: "This approach,"
said the Court, "tends to rein in the subjective elements that are necessarily present
in due process judicial review."55 But as predicted by Brennan and confirmed by
subsequent cases, the test was in fact highly indeterminate. The notion of "tradition,"
wrote Brennan, "can be as malleable and as elusive as 'liberty' itself... [b]ecause
reasonable people can disagree about the content of particular traditions, and because
they can disagree even about which traditions are relevant to the definition of
'liberty."'' 56 Indeed, due process jurisprudence is replete with disputes not only
about the correct interpretation of historical data,57 but also about what data is rele-
vant: while some Justices seem to believe that the older the data the stronger its legal
authority-going back to the thirteenth century in search of relevant practices 5 -
others claim that the most relevant data is that of "the past half century."5 9
53 Id.
I ld. at 139-40 (citations omitted).
" Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 722 (1997).
56 Michael H., 491 U.S. at 137 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
57 See, e.g., Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 190-94 (1986)(discussing the conflicting
interpretations of American traditions regarding homosexuality), overruled by Lawrence v.
Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 571-73 (2003).
58 See, e.g., Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 711 ("[F]or over 700 years, the Anglo-American
common-law tradition has punished or otherwise disapproved of both suicide and assisting
suicide. In the 13th century, Henry de Bracton, one of the first legal-treatise writers, observed
that '[jiust as a man may commit felony by slaying another so may he do so by slaying
himself."' (citations omitted)).
5' Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 571-72. ("[Wie think that our laws and traditions in the past
half century are of most relevance here. These references show an emerging awareness that
[Vol. 16:497
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The test's indeterminacy was not helped by the Court's manipulation of the
"careful description" requirement. In Washington v. Glucksberg, where the Court
was faced with an asserted right to assisted suicide, the "careful description" of the
alleged right was the "right to commit suicide which itself includes a right to assi-
stance in doing so."' So whereas in Bowers and Michael H. the Court described the
asserted rights in exceedingly narrow and case-specific ways, in Glucksberg the
Court depicted a broad right far wider than the one articulated by the claimants them-
selves, who merely asserted the right of terminally ill patients (all claimants died of
their illness before the case reached the Court) to be aided in their imminent death
by their licensed physicians, all of whom were experts in the treatment of the termi-
nally ill.6 If what is meant by a "careful description" of the asserted right can be
either an exceedingly narrow description or an exceedingly wide one, the "sub-
jective elements" of due process review cannot have been "reined in."
B. The Rational Basis Test
Due process claims that do not implicate fundamental rights are scrutinized
using the rational basis test, which requires that the challenged governmental action
bear a rational relationship to a legitimate governmental interest.62 As noted above,
the test is famed for its great deference to legislative enactments and has proven easy
to pass. Nevertheless, the axe does descend sometimes.
Some scholars have come to believe that the Supreme Court, although not
explicitly acknowledging the fact, is also sometimes engaged in a heightened form
of rational basis review. 63 This alleged heightened review tends to appear in cases
affecting disfavored groups. It is found mostly in the Equal Protection Clause
context,' but may have made a recent appearance in the substantive due process
case of Lawrence v. Texas.65
liberty gives substantial protection to adult persons in deciding how to conduct their private
lives in matters pertaining to sex.").
60 521 U.S. at 723.
61 Id. at 739 (Stevens, J., concurring).
62 See id. at 735 (majority opinion).
63 See, e.g., LAURENCEH. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTrrUTIONALLAw § 1611 (2d ed. 1988);
Robert C. Farrell, Successful Rational Basis Claims in the Supreme Court from the 1971 Term
Through Romer v. Evans, 32 IND. L. REV. 357 (1999); Gunther, supra note 41, at 12. Justice
O'Connor acknowledged that fact in Lawrence v. Texas. 539 U.S. at 580 (O'Connor, J.,
concurring) ("When a law exhibits ... a desire to harm a politically unpopular group, we have
applied a more searching form of rational review to strike down such laws .... ").
6 See, e.g., Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620 (1996) (invalidating a Colorado constitutional
amendment prohibiting all legislative, executive, or judicial action designed to protect
homosexuals from discrimination); Dep't of Agric. v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528, 534 (1973)
(invalidating a federal statute denying food stamps to any household containing an individual
unrelated to any other member of the household).
65 539 U.S. 558 (2003); see also Civil Liberties for Urban Believers v. City of Chicago, 342
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III. THE BURDEN ON REGISTRANTS' LIBERTY
The principal constitutional interest implicated in the case of nonsexual
registrants is their substantive due process right in "liberty"-a constitutional
concept going well beyond mere freedom from physical restraint.' The burdens on
liberty affected by sex offender registration are substantial: depending on the state,
registrants are required to register periodically with a law enforcement agency-
sometimes in person,67 sometimes as often as every thirty days-often for life, at the
very least for ten years after their release from prison.68 They are required to pro-
vide personal information that includes their address, employment, enrollment in an
educational institution, a photograph (periodically updated), the vehicle they drive,
a biological sample, and whether they seek psychiatric counseling.69 They must
notify local law enforcement agencies-sometimes within twenty-four hours, some-
times within three days-of any change, temporary or permanent, in that infor-
mation, including any change in their facial features (shaving a moustache for
example), any time they borrow a car from a friend, or any time they see a mental
health specialist.7" Failure to register or re-register is usually a felony punishable by
F.3d 752, 769-70 (7th Cir. 2003) (Posner, J., dissenting), cert. denied, 541 U.S. 1096 (2004).
6 "Without doubt, [liberty] denotes not merely freedom from bodily restraint but also the
right of the individual... generally to enjoy those privileges long recognized... as essential
to the orderly pursuit of happiness by free men." Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923).
67 See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. §54-257(c) (2001) (stating that all sexual offenders,
including nonviolent offenders, must register by mail every ninety days); N.Y. CORRECT.
LAW § 168-h (Consol. 2003) (requiring level three offenders to register in person every
ninety days for life).
68 The federally mandated minimum is ten years. See 42 U.S.C.A. § 1407 I(b)(6)(A)-(B)
(West Supp. 2007) (stating that a registrant must register for a period of ten years unless he
or she has more than one sex offense conviction, has been convicted of an aggravated
offense, or has been determined a "sexually violent predator"-in which case the registration
is for life).
69 See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. § 54-251 (a) (2001) (requiring a photograph upon request);
FLA. STAT. ANN. § 943.325 (West 2006) (requiring two specimens of blood); KAN. STAT.
ANN. § 22-4907(a)-(b) (1995) (requiring that registrants include a photograph, address, and
fingerprints); MIss. CODE ANN. § 45-33-37 (2005) (requiring a biological sample for DNA
testing), amended by 2006 Miss. Laws 563 (retaining the biological sample requirement);
OKLA. STAT. tit. 57, § 584 (2004) (requiring a photograph, biological samples, employment
information, and address).
70 See e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. §§ 54-251(a), 54-252(a), 54-254(a) (2001) (stating that
whenever any registrant changes his or her address, he or she must notify the Commissioner
of Public Safety within five days. If he or she "regularly travels into or within another state
or temporarily resides in another state for purposes including, but not limited to employment
or schooling," he or she must notify the Connecticut Commissioner of Public Safety and
register with the appropriate agency in the other state).
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years of imprisonment, 7' and in some jurisdictions a conviction does not even
require a showing of intentional or willful evasion.72 Some states prohibit registered
sex offenders from living or working within a certain distance of a school, a day care
center, a community center, or any place where minors congregate. 73 Registrants'
information is made available to the public via government websites that usually
refer to the registrant as "sex offender" or "sexual predator," and that exhibit, among
other things, a photograph, an address, the make of the offender's vehicle, and his
employer's address. 74 Some jurisdictions require community-wide notifications,
which include door-to-door notices and media publications.75 In some jurisdictions,
the offender's information may be shared with "significant others, landlords,
neighbors, [and] employers.., if it is determined that providing the information is
in the best interest of public safety and/or the offender's rehabilitation. 76
7' See, e.g., id. §§ 54-25 l(d), 54-252(d) (2001); DEL. CODEANN. tit. 11, § 4121(t) (2001);
FLA. STAT. ANN. § 943.0435(9) (West 2006).
72 See, e.g., State v. Bryant, 614 S.E.2d 479,484-85 (N.C. 2005) (holding that no show-
ing of knowledge or intent is required to prove the violation).
73 See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 15-20-26(a) (LexisNexis 2005) (prohibiting sex offenders from
living within 2000 feet of a school or a child care center); GA. CODE ANN. § 42-1-15(b)
(2007) (prohibiting sex offenders from working within 1000 feet of a school, day care center,
or area where minors congregate); 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/11-9.3(a), (b), (b-5) (West
2002); id. 5/11-9.4 (a), (b), (b-5) (West 2002) (prohibiting sex offenders from living within
500 feet of any school building or public park); IOWA CODE § 692A.2A(2) (2003)
(prohibiting residency within 2000 feet of a school or registered child care facility).
14 Alaska is typical in the information it makes available to the public, which includes:
[T]he sex offender's or child kidnapper's name, aliases, address,
photograph, physical description, description of motor vehicles, license
numbers of motor vehicles, and vehicle identification numbers of
motor vehicles, place of employment, date of birth, crime for which
convicted, date of conviction, place and court of conviction, length and
conditions of sentence, and a statement as to whether the offender...
is in compliance with [the] requirements... or cannot be located.
ALASKA STAT. § 18.65.087(b) (2004).
75 See, e.g., WIS. STAT. ANN. § 301.46 (West 2003), as amended by 2005-2006 Wis.
Legis. Serv. 431 (West); Wisconsin Department of Corrections: Sex Offender Registry
Frequently Asked Questions, http://offender.doc.state.wi.us/public/fyi/faq.jsp. (last visited
Sep. 12, 2007); see also 42 U.S.C.A. § 14071(e)(2) (West Supp. 2007) (listing the ways by
which information can be released to the public); ALA. CODE § 15-20-25(b) (LexisNexis
2005) (allowing employer's address to appear on a website); IOWA CODE § 692A.13(2)(b)
(2006) (authorizing registry information to be distributed through print, audio/visual
materials, and/or radio); cf. State v. Bollig, 605 N.W.2d 199, 205 (Wis. 2000).
76 Wis. DEP'T OF CORRECTIONS SUPERVISION OF SEX OFFENDERS: A HANDBOOK FOR
AGENTS §7.14 (2002), available at http://www.wi-doc.con/04-12-2004/Sex%200ffender
%20Manual.pdf; see also Wisconsin Department of Corrections: SOR Community Noti-
fication, http://offender.doc.state.wi.us/public/proginfo/communitynotification.jsp (last visit-
ed Sept. 12, 2007).
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The ready availability of the information often makes it extremely difficult for
registrants to find employment or housing,77 and many are subjected to harassment
and the threat of vigilante actions.78 A study published by the Department of Justice
examined the impact of community notification provisions 79 (as noted previously,
such provisions were added to the Jacob Wetterling Act in 1996 and were sub-
sequently adopted by all fifty states).8" The study reports:
Loss of employment, exclusion from residence, and the breakup
of personal relationships were frequently cited consequences of
expanded notification actions and ensuing detrimental publicity.
Seventy-seven percent told of being humiliated in their daily
lives, ostracized by neighbors and lifetime acquaintances, and
harassed or threatened by nearby residents or strangers. Although
only one interviewee [out of thirty] was on the receiving end of
what might be described as a vigilante action, all expressed
various degrees of concern for their own safety.
Two-thirds of the interviewed sex offenders also spoke of how
community notification unfavorably affected the lives of family
members, including parents, siblings, and offspring. Several
cited emotionally painful examples. One interviewee talked of
his mother's anguish and depression following newspaper
accounts stemming from notification. Another spoke of his son's
decision to quit his high school football team because of ridicule
from teammates, and a third related how his sister was shunned
by former friends .... Some of the interviewees... had to accept
residence in minimum-security prisons or correctional centers
because of the lack of alternative housing in the community.
Expanded notification has created enormous obstacles in
locating housing resources for returning sex offenders."'
77 See, e.g., State v. Myers, 923 P.2d 1024, 1041 (Kan. 1996) ('The practical effect of
such unrestricted dissemination could make it impossible for the offender to find housing
or employment.").
78 "[Plublic dissemination of information about their conviction has [allegedly] subjected
registrants to 'threats, anonymous letters telling them to move, loss of housing, reduced
educational opportunities for themselves and their children and siblings whose performance
in school is affected by the notoriety of the public listing."' Akella v. Mich. Dep't of State
Police, 67 F. Supp. 2d 716, 730 (E.D. Mich. 1999).
79 RICHARD G. ZEv1Tz & MARY ANN FARKAS, NATIONAL INSTITUTE OF JUSTICE:
RESEARCH IN BRIEF, SEX OFFENDER COMMUNITY NOTIFICATION: ASSESSING THE IMPACT IN
WISCONSIN, 9-10 (2000), available at http://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffilesl/nij/179992.pdf.
80 See supra note 30 and accompanying text.
8 ZEvIZ & FARKAS, supra note 79, at 9-10.
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Finally, registrants are barred from suing the government for any damages resulting
from the good faith implementation of a sex offender registration act.82
IV. STRICT SCRUTINY
The claim of nonsexual registrants is that their registration as sex offenders, and
the dissemination of their registration information, is an infringement of their liberty
in violation of substantive due process. Nonsexual criminals have three independent
grounds weighing in favor of strict constitutional scrutiny of their claim: a funda-
mental right to freedom from intrusive registration requirements (shared with all sex
offender registrants), a fundamental right to freedom from government defamation,
and their status as a burdened group whose interests were essentially ignored during
the legislative process.
A. Fundamental Rights: Registration and Reputation
The first step in examining this due process claim is determining whether it impli-
cates a "fundamental right."83 As noted above, this establishes the constitutional test
82 "Law enforcement agencies, employees of law enforcement agencies and independent
contractors acting at the direction of such agencies, and State officials shall be immune from
liability for good faith conduct under this section." 42 U.S.C.A. § 14071(f) (West Supp. 2007).
83 Some courts faced with the substantive due process claim of nonsexual registrants
erroneously applied a threshold test, entitled the "stigma-plus" test, which requires a showing
of a "constitutionally cognizant interest" before a court will examine the merits of the claim.
See, e.g., State v. Robinson, 873 So. 2d 1205, 1219-20 (Fla. 2004) (Wells, J., dissenting);
People v. Bell, 778 N.Y.S.2d 837, 843 (Sup. Ct. 2003). The "stigma plus" test was first
announced by the Supreme Court in the much criticized Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693 (1976).
Paul held that more than mere injury to reputation ("stigma") needed to be shown before a
constitutionally cognizant interest warranting constitutional scrutiny could be recognized.
Id. at 701-02. The "stigma-plus" test, however, is inapplicable to substantive due process
claims. The confusion is caused by the apparent similarity between the claims advanced in
Paul and those of nonsexual registrants: Paul involved a man who had been arrested and
arraigned for shoplifting, had never been tried for the crime, and then discovered his name
and photograph appearing on a list of "active shoplifters" distributed by the police to local
businesses. Id. at 697. He claimed a constitutional due process violation, but the Court
refused to reach the merits of his claim by holding that mere injury to reputation did not
implicate a constitutionally cognizant interest. Id. at 710-12. Paul, however, involved a
procedural due process claim, and the Court explicitly stated that its decision was "limited
to consideration of the procedural guarantees of the Due Process Clause and was not
intended to describe those substantive limitations upon state action which may be
encompassed within the concept of 'liberty."' Id. at 711 n.5. The threshold showing of a
constitutionally cognizant interest has no place in the context of substantive due process. See
KATHLEEN M. SuLLIvAN & GERALD GUNTHER, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 630 (15th ed. 2004).
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to be employed in the case-"strict scrutiny" or "rational basis review"-which is
an important decision for a claim's chance of success.
Nonsexual offenders have alleged that their registration implicates a variety of
"fundamental rights,"' including a fundamental right to liberty, the right to privacy,
and the right to travel; but virtually all courts examining the issue have rejected the
claim, either refusing to recognize a new fundamental right or rejecting attempts to
fit the affected interest into an existing fundamental right category.85 Given the cur-
rent state of "fundamental rights" analysis we saw above, this is unsurprising.
Nevertheless, courts' discussions of the issue have often been extremely cursory. The
Illinois Supreme Court, for example, simply noted in passing that "the challenged
statute does not affect a fundamental right"86 and cited a previous case, a case which
in turn resolved the issue by stating: "[The appellant] does not argue, nor do we
find, that the statute at issue affects a fundamental right. Accordingly, we analyze
the statute at issue using the rational basis test.,88 Hence, one unreasoned deter-
mination relied on another unreasoned one. One New York court justified its de-
cision with a somewhat lengthier but rather absurd argument highlighting the sorry
state of current constitutional doctrine:
If the right to enter into a same sex marriage is not considered
fundamental, the right to avoid stigmatization as a sex offender
where defendant has not engaged in any express sexual conduct
most certainly cannot rise to this status. Sex offender registra-
tion statutes did not become widespread before the 1990's; it can
hardly be claimed that the rights implicated by SORA are
"deeply rooted in our Nation's history."89
And yet, the refusal to recognize an implicated fundamental right results in a
very lax constitutional test for a highly invasive civil, non-criminal governmental
" For the argument that sex offender registration acts implicate fundamental rights, see
Marissa Ceglian, Predators or Prey: Mandatory Listing of Non-Predatory Offenders on
Predatory Offender Registries, 12 J.L. & POL'Y 843 (2004); Melissa Blair, Comment,
Wisconsin's Sex OffenderRegistration and Notification Laws: Has the Wisconsin Legislature
Left the Criminals and the Constitution Behind?, 87 MARQ. L. REv. 939 (2004); Catherine
A. Trinkle, Note, Federal Standards for Sex Offender Registration: Public Disclosure
Confronts the Right to Privacy, 37 WM. & MARY L. REv. 299 (1995).
85 One exception is Bell, 778 N.Y.S.2d at 845, which erroneously deduced the presence
of a fundamental right from the fact that the "stigma-plus" test was satisfied. See supra note
83 (providing a quick summary of the "stigma-plus" test).
86 People v. Johnson, 870 N.E.2d 415, 421-22 (Ill. 2007).
87 Id. at 422 n.2 (citing In re J.W., 787 N.E.2d 747, 757 (Ill. 2003)).
8 In re J. W., 787 N.E.2d at 757.
89 People v. Cintron, 827 N.Y.S.2d 445, 453 (Sup. Ct. 2006).
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actiong°-indeed, the sort of action ordinarily identified with authoritative regimes."1
As one Massachusetts Supreme Court Justice put it: "To require registration of
persons not in connection with any particular activity asserts a relationship between
government and the individual that is in principle quite alien to our traditions, a
relationship which when generalized has been the hallmark of totalitarian govern-
ment."92 The justice added: "This is not to say that registration is always an unjusti-
fiable infringement on liberty, but only that any justification for it must take into
account its peculiar burdens in measuring them against the harm to be averted." '93
However, weighing the interests advanced against the burdens imposed is only
required in the case of fundamental rights, where courts examine the importance of
the interest involved, but not under rational basis review, which is deliberately de-
signed to avoid the "balancing of competing interests."94 Thus, if no fundamental
right is involved in this civil, non-punitive regulation, then requiring citizens to peri-
odically register and provide the authorities with detailed personal information need
not be supported by any important or "compelling" government interest: it is enough
that the interest served is "legitimate," and that the requirement is rationally related
to it. This is a rather odd result, given American "history and traditions."
But nonsexual registrants-as opposed to all registrants-have an additional
alleged fundamental right, independent of the right to be free from onerous regi-
stration requirements: the right not to be publicly identified by the government as
something that they are not-namely, sex offenders. This false designation con-
cerns the legal protection in reputation-a concern with very deep roots in our law.95
9 See Smith v. Doe, 538 U.S. 84 (2003) (holding that retroactive application of sex
offender registration did not violate the Ex Post Facto Clause because it was part of a civil,
non-punitive scheme).
9' Doe v. Att'y Gen., 686 N.E.2d 1007, 1016 (Mass. 1997) (Fried, J., concurring).
92 id.
93 Id.
9 Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 722 (1997).
9' See, e.g., LAURENCE H. ELDRIDGE, THE LAW OF DEFAMATION § 53, 293-94 (1978)
("There is no doubt about the historical fact that the interest in one's good name was
considered an important interest requiring legal protection more than a thousand years ago;
and that so far as Anglo-Saxon history is concerned this interest became a legally protected
interest comparatively soon after the interest in bodily integrity was given legal protection.").
An English statute from 1275 provided civil and criminal remedies in the King's courts for
"great men of the realm" who had been defamed, and this statutory recognition followed
many years of judicial protection of reputation going back at least as far as the eleventh
century. See Frank Carr, The English Law of Defamation (pts. I-II), 18 LAW Q. REv. 255,
388 (1902); Gregory C. Lisby, No Place in the Law: The Ignominy of Criminal Libel in
American Jurisprudence, 9 COMM. L. & POL'Y 433 (2004); Colin Rhys Lovell, The
"Reception" of Defamation by the Common Law, 15 VAND. L. REv. 1051 (1962); Jerome
Lawrence Merin, The Supreme Court and Libel, 11 WM. & MARY L. REv. 371 (1969); Van
Vechten Veeder, The History and Theory of the Law of Defamation 1, 3 COLUM. L. REv. 546
(1903); Van Vechten Veeder, The History and Theory of the Law of Defamation 11, 4
COLUM. L. REV. 33 (1904).
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Indeed, American legal protections of reputation are so well entrenched that only in
1964 was it first recognized that the First Amendment imposed some constitutional
limitations on anti-defamation laws-limitations whose scope remains rather
limited.96 Both civil and criminal penalties for defamation remain widespread in
American law, though criminal prosecutions are extremely rare.97 Even more to the
point, special legal protections have been extended in regard to accusations of
criminal conduct (sex offender registration avers a conviction for a sexual crime).
In civil actions, such accusations are considered "defamation per se," so that no
proof of actual damages is required in order to claim reparations.98 And threatening
a person with public accusations of criminal conduct so as to obtain some object of
value has long been criminally punished as extortion. 99
The protection of reputation in American law, particularly in relation to charges
of criminal conduct, is undoubtedly "rooted in the traditions and conscience of our
people" and has been repeatedly and explicitly recognized by the U.S. Supreme Court
as one "implicit in the concept of ordered liberty." "[T]he individual's right to the
protection of his own good name," declared the Supreme Court on several occasions,
"reflects no more than our basic concept of the essential dignity and worth of every
human being-a concept at the root of any decent system of ordered liberty."' ° Such
9 See, e.g., Konigsberg v. State Bar of Cal., 366 U.S. 36,49 n. 10 (1961) (explaining that
freedom of speech is not absolute); Times Film Corp. v. City of Chicago, 365 U.S. 43, 48
(1961) (holding that not all motion pictures are protected); Roth v. United States, 354 U.S.
476,481-85 (1957) (holding that obscene speech is not protected); Beauhamais v. Illinois,
343 U.S. 250, 266 (1952) (holding that libelous speech is not protected); Pennekamp v.
Florida, 328 U.S. 331,348-49 (1946) (holding that editorials did not pose clear and present
danger to the administration of justice, but could be libelous); Chaplinsky v. New
Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 574 (1942) (holding that offensive words are not protected); Near
v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697 (1931) (limiting freedom of the press). The case recognizing
those limits was the landmark New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964), which
nevertheless applied only to defamation of "public officials."
" See Lisby, supra note 95, at 479-80 (listing American jurisdictions that have criminal
libel laws); see also, Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64, 67-70 (1964) (discussing common
law defamation); Beauharnais, 343 U.S. at 254-55 (discussing the history of criminal libel).
98 See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 571 (1977) ("One who publishes a
slander that imputes to another conduct constituting a criminal offense is subject to liability
to the other without proof of special harm if the offense imputed is of a type which, if
committed in the place of publication, would be (a) punishable by imprisonment in a state
or federal institution, or (b) regarded by public opinion as involving moral turpitude.").
99 See 31A AM. JuR. 2D Extortion, Blackmail, and Threats §§ 1-4 (2002).
"0 Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 341 (1974) (quoting Rosenblatt v. Baer,
383 U.S. 75, 92 (1966) (Stewart, J., concurring)); see also Spencer v. Kemna, 523 U.S. 1,
24 n.5 (1998) (Stevens, J., dissenting); Milkovich v. Lorain Journal Co., 497 U.S. 1, 22
(1990); Phila. Newspapers, Inc. v. Hepps, 475 U.S. 767,781 (1986) (Stevens, J., dissenting);
Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc., 472 U.S. 749,758 (1985); Paul v. Davis,
424 U.S. 693, 723 (1976) (Brennan, J., dissenting); Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, Inc., 403
U.S. 29, 78 (1971) (Marshall, J., dissenting); In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 363-64 (1970)
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protections should be especially strict when the defamation originates not from a
private party, but from the government, with its aura of authority.
(The one precedent which appears to conflict with this claim of an implicated
fundamental right is the notorious Paul v. Davis,'°1 a widely criticized decision
which declared that "the interest in reputation alone" did not even amount to a
cognizant constitutional interest.'0 2 But as explained earlier, Paul was strictly and
explicitly confined to procedural due process issues, and the reasons leading to its
startling conclusion are in any case wholly irrelevant to the case at hand.)'0 3
In short, two alleged fundamental rights appear to be implicated in the sexual
registration of nonsexual criminals: a fundamental right to freedom from civil, non-
criminal intrusive registration requirements, which extends to all registrants, and a
fundamental right to freedom from false government accusations of sexual criminal
conviction, which is limited to nonsexual registrants.
B. Suspect Classes in the Due Process Context
There is an additional reason, independent of any alleged fundamental right, for
subjecting the sex offender registration of nonsexual criminals to a heightened
constitutional review: such action implicates anti-majoritarian concerns."° The
principal rationale for the laxity of rational basis review is judicial deference to the
legislative products of the democratic process. But this deference has much less
justification when the regulated group is distinct, politically powerless, and
("Accordingly, a society that values the good name and freedom of every individual should
not condemn a man for commission of a crime when there is reasonable doubt about his
guilt." (emphasis added)); Rosenblatt, 383 U.S. at 92 (Stewart, J., concurring); id. at 86
(majority opinion) (explaining that the court had regularly acknowledged the "important
social values which underlie the law of defamation," and recognized that "[s]ociety has a
pervasive and strong interest in preventing and redressing attacks upon reputation").
101 424 U.S. 693 (1976).
102 Id. at 711; see, e.g., McClendon v. Turner, 765 F. Supp. 251, 254 (W.D. Pa. 1991);
William Burnham, Separating Constitutional and Common-Law Torts: A Critique and a
Proposed Constitutional Theory of Duty, 73 MINN. L. REv. 515, 581 (1989); Erwin
Chemerinsky, The Supreme Court and the Fourteenth Amendment: The Unfulfilled Promise,
25 LoY. L.A. L. REv. 1143, 1152 (1992); Richard J. Pierce, Jr., The Due Process
Counterrevolution of the 1990s?, 96 COLUM. L. REv. 1973, 1983-84 (1996). See generally
supra note 83 (discussing Paul in more depth). Interestingly, Justice Brennan, who dissented
in the case, thought that the Court's refusal to recognize a constitutional interest was simply
an inadvertent confusion. Paul, 424 U.S. at 728-29 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
103 See supra note 83. Paul's principal reasoning was based on federalism: the Court
feared that allowing the action for damages under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 would entail a wholesale
conversion of state tort actions into constitutional claims whenever the tortfeasor was a
government actor. Paul, 424 U.S. at 699. See TRIBE, supra note 63, § 1611; Laurence H.
Tribe, Unraveling National League of Cities: The New Federalism and Affirmative Rights
to Essential Government Services, 90 HARV. L. REv. 1065, 1100 n. 135 (1977).
"04 See United States v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S. 144, 153 n.4 (1938).
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unpopular. In such instances the legislative process may fail to give voice to the
interests of that group, and a hostile majority may trample the group's most
important civil rights without adequate justification. The relevance of this
consideration to determining the proper level of constitutional scrutiny has been
recognized since the famous footnote four of United States v. Carolene Products
Co., in which the Supreme Court noted that "prejudice against discrete and insular
minorities may be a special condition, which tends seriously to curtail the operation
of those political processes ordinarily to be relied upon to protect minorities, and
which may call for a correspondingly more searching judicial inquiry."' 5 That com-
ment, although made in the context of a substantive due process claim, has deve-
loped into an equal protection doctrine where courts subject regulations affecting
"suspect classes" to heightened forms of constitutional scrutiny; 1°6 but the insight
has been practically abandoned in the substantive due process context. This may not
be surprising given that the comment focuses on the nature of the affected class-a
factor which appears most pertinent to equal protection concerns-and yet, the
worry over the potential tyranny of a hostile majority is just as pertinent for due
process challenges: surely a majority may tyrannize a minority "regardless of how
other individuals in the same situation may be treated."' 7 The abandonment of this
concern in the context of the Due Process Clause from which it originated is but
another unwarranted emasculation of due process jurisprudence.
There can be little doubt that those targeted for sex offender registration-both
sexual and nonsexual criminals-share the characteristics giving rise to anti-
majoritarian concerns: they constitute a distinct and easily identifiable minority,
often without a voice in the democratic process-many states disenfranchise
convicted felons 0 8 -and they are highly unpopular. Indeed, it is hard to think of a
group less popular than suspected sex offenders who victimized minors-even
terrorists may lose on this one.
The legislative history of sex offender registration statutes bears out this concern.
Senator David Durenberger of Minnesota, one of the sponsors of the Jacob
Wetterling Act in the U.S. Senate-who was himself later convicted of a nonsexual
105 Id.
106 See, e.g., Sugarman v. Dougall, 413 U.S. 634 (1973).
07 Ross v. Moffitt, 417 U.S. 600,609 (1974). "Equal protection... emphasizes disparity
in treatment by a State between classes of individuals," in contrast to due process, which
"emphasizes fairness between the State and the individual dealing with the State." Id.
108 Nationally, more than four million Americans are denied the right to
vote as a result of laws that prohibit voting by felons or ex-felons. In
48 states (with the exception of Maine and Vermont) and the District
of Columbia prisoners cannot vote, in 33 states felons on probation or
parole are disenfranchised, and in 12 states a felony conviction can
result in a lifetime ban long after the completion of a sentence.
STEVEN KALOGERAS, THE SENTENCING PROJECT, LEGISLATIVE CHANGES ON FELONY
DISENFRANCHISEMENT, 1996-2003, at I (Marc Mauer ed., 2003), available at http://www
.sentencingproject.org/Admin/Documents/publications/fdlegischanges96_03.pdf.
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albeit non-registrable offense" ° -made the following statement when introducing
the Jacob Wetterling Bill in the U.S. Senate: "Mr. President, for this Senator, there
are no competing issues to debate. If a registration requirement for convicted sex
offenders will assist law enforcement authorities in one criminal apprehension, or
if it will deter a single kidnaping, I believe it is worth implementing."' " His
declared-indeed, flaunted--disregard for potential registrants was echoed in word
and action by many federal and state legislators: unanimous votes---often without
debates--on sex offender registration statutes were common, as were unanimous
votes on subsequent legislative amendments-each allowing one politician or another
to claim credit for an ever-toughening regulation of actual and purported sex
offenders."' In such a legislative climate, courts must provide a counter-majoritarian
oversight that is at odds with the highly deferential "rational basis" review and its
"presumption of constitutionality.""..2
To sum up, publicly declaring criminals "sex offenders," and subjecting them
to detailed, intrusive, and potentially dangerous registration requirements, espe-
cially when their crimes were nonsexual, implicates freedoms that are "rooted in the
traditions and conscience of our people as to be ranked as fundamental" and also
"0 Durenberger plead guilty in 1995 to five misdemeanor charges of stealing public funds.
Ex-Senator Is Given A Year's Probation, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 30, 1995, at B17.
110 137 CONG. REC. 12,529 (1991) (statement of Sen. Durenberger).
". Steven Young & Bryan Brickner, This Man is Not a Sexual Predator, CHI. READER
(Oct. 21, 2005), available at http://www.chicagoreader.com (reporting that the sex offender
registration bill passed the Illinois Senate without debate, apart from a few routine questions
about procedure, and without opposition); see also State v. Druktenis, 86 P.3d 1050, 1068
(N.M. Ct. App. 2004) ("[New Mexico's] Megan's Law 'was enacted in a matter of weeks'
after the occurrence of the sex offense against Megan and 'was never subjected to any kind
of scientific review, nor were the state and federal statutes that flowed from it."'); Press
Release, Hawaii Governor Linda Lingle, Governor Lingle Signs Sex Offender Law (May 9,
2005), available at http://www.hawaii.gov/gov/news/releases/2005/News_Item.2005-05-
09.2426 (announcing that she signed into law a bill enlarging public access to sex offender
registration information, which passed unanimously); Press Release, Tenn. State Senator
Mark Norris, Norris Bills Strengthen Sex Offender Registration Laws (May 12, 2006),
available at http://www.marknorris.org/NNews2006/05-12-06.html (announcing his Senate
sponsorship of a bill enlarging the scope of sex offender registration requirements in
Tennessee, which passed unanimously); Press Release, Senate Democratic Leader Harry
Reid, Reid: Senate Bill Will Protect Children (May 5, 2006), available at http://reid.senate
.gov/newsroom/record.cfm?id=255261 (announcing his sponsorship of a recently enacted
amendment enlarging the scope of the Federal Sex Offender Registration and Notification
Act, which passed unanimously).
12 For authoritative scholarly support for this proposition, see JOHN HART ELY,
DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW 60-63, 101-04 (1980); T.
Alexander Aleinikoff, Constitutional Law in the Age of Balancing, 96 YALEL.J. 943,984-86
(1987); Laurence H. Tribe & Michael C. Dorf, Levels of Generality in the Definition of
Rights, 57 U. CHI. L. REv. 1057 (1990).
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implicates constitutional anti-majoritarian concerns." 3 Such government action
should be subjected to strict constitutional scrutiny and should therefore be invali-
dated unless narrowly tailored to serve a compelling state interest. Since the assert-
ed governmental purpose is the prevention of future crime by recidivist sex
offenders and the quick apprehension of such recidivists when they reoffend, a
statute mandating the sexual registration of nonsexual offenders is clearly not
"narrowly tailored."
V. THE RATIONAL BASIS TEST
The registration of nonsexual offenders in sex offender registries also fails the
much laxer rational basis test, which is employed whenever a due process claim
does not implicate a fundamental right.' The test requires that the challenged
governmental action bear a rational relationship to a legitimate governmental
interest." 5 Several courts concluded that the registration of nonsexual offenders
fails this test: the governmental interest involved-the prevention of future crime
by recidivist sex offenders and their quick apprehension when they reoffend-was
certainly legitimate, but there was insufficient rational relation between that interest
and requiring nonsexual offenders to register. 16 These courts reasoned that it was
the sexual component of an offender's crime that indicated the high likelihood of
recidivism and that formed the basis for the registration requirement. This claim
was also the one made by the sponsors of the Jacob Wetterling Act in Congress:
The reasons for enacting this legislation on the national level
are clear: sexual crimes against children are widespread; the
people who commit these offenses repeat their crimes again and
again . . . . The widespread tragedy of sexual abuse and
molestation of children is compounded by the fact that child sex
offenders are serial offenders. A National Institute of Mental
Health study found that the typical offender molests an average
of 117 children, most of whom do not report the offense. Those
who attack young boys molest an average of 281. A study of
imprisoned offenders found that 74 percent had one or more
"3 See Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325 (1937), overruled by Benton v. Maryland,
395 U.S. 784 (1969).
14 See, e.g., Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 631 (1996).
"H See Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 735 (1997).
116 See, e.g., State v. Robinson, 873 So. 2d 1205 (Fla. 2004); State v. Reine, No. 19157,
2003 WL 77174 (Ohio Ct. App. Jan. 10, 2003); State v. Barksdale, No. 19294, 2003 WL
77115 (Ohio Ct. App. Jan. 10, 2003) (identical opinion, different defendant); State v.
Washington, No. 99-L-015, 2001 WL 1415568 (Ohio Ct. App. Nov. 14, 2001); cf State v.
Young, No. 19472, 2003 WL 2004025 (Ohio Ct. App. May 2, 2003).
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prior convictions for a sexual offense against a child. The
behavior of child sex offenders is repetitive to the point of
compulsion. In fact, one State prison psychologist has observed
that sex offenders against children have the same personality
characteristics as serial killers."'
Now since the sexual component-the alleged indicator of recidivism-is lacking
in the case of nonsexual offenders, the asserted governmental interest bears no
rational relationship to the registration of nonsexual offenders.
But other courts disagreed, declaring that the legislature "could rationally
conclude"" 8 that the kidnapping or false imprisonment of minors are "often a pre-
cursor to more grievous sexual offenses,""1. 9 and that there was therefore a rational
relation between means and ends.' 20 A recent decision of the Illinois Supreme Court
is a typical example of the judicial reasoning upholding the constitutionality of the
practice under rational basis review: "The purpose of the [sex offender registration]
Act," said the court, "is to aid law enforcement by facilitating ready access to
information about sex offenders and, therefore, to protect the public. This is obvi-
ously a legitimate state interest."' 2' The more difficult question concerned the
rationality of registering nonsexual criminals as sex offenders in order to advance that
interest: "[W]e ask whether it was reasonable to require the defendant, a nonparent
convicted of aggravated kidnapping of a minor, to register under the Act, regardless
of whether this offense was sexually motivated."'' 22 Answering the question in the
affirmative, the court borrowed heavily from a recent New York case-People v.
Cintron, cited previously for its silly fundamental rights analysis' 23-that relied on
"1 137 CONG. REc. 12,529 (1991) (statement of Sen. Durenberger); see also 139 CONG.
REC. 12,057 (1993) (statement of Sen. Durenberger). The resulting Jacob Wetterling Act also
requires the registration of those convicted of sexual crimes against adults. See 42 U.S.C.A.
§ 14071 (West Supp. 2007).
.. People v. Johnson, 870 N.E.2d 415,424 (111. 2007) (citing In re Phillip C., 847 N.E.2d
801, 808 (Ill. App. Ct. 2006) ("[T]he legislature could rationally conclude that kidnappers
of children pose such a threat to sexually assault those children as to warrant their inclusion
in the sex offender registry.")).
19 See, e.g., People v. Beard, 851 N.E.2d 141, 146 (Ill. App. Ct. 2006) (citing People v.
Fuller, 756 N.E.2d 255, 259 (Ill. App. Ct. 2001)).
20 See People v. Cintron, 827 N.Y.S.2d 445, 455-56 (Sup. Ct. 2006).
121 Johnson, 870 N.E.2d at 422 (citations omitted). The registration of nonsexual criminals
in Illinois was eliminated in 2006 through a legislative amendment requiring that all
registered sex offenders have a sexual motivation to their crime. Id. at 418. Nevertheless, the
Illinois Supreme Court held that Johnson fell under the pre-amendment statute, and that
therefore the constitutionality of the sexual registration of nonsexual criminals was squarely
before it. Id. at 419. The court upheld the constitutionality of the practice. Id. at 426.
122 Id. at 422.
.23 See supra note 89 and accompanying text.
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a 1990 Department of Justice study which reported that two-thirds of non-family
abductions involve sexual assault. 124 Since non-parent abductions of minors posed
a substantial risk of sexual assault, concluded the Illinois Supreme Court (following
the New York case), the requirement was a rational means to advance a legitimate
government purpose.25 The court added, again following Cintron, that Illinois was
required to register nonsexual criminals in its sex offender registries in order to
obtain compliance with the federal Act.
126
All courts upholding the constitutionality of the practice under rational basis
review relied on a similar line of reasoning. 12' Let us then look at the proffered
arguments in more detail, starting with their factual inaccuracies.
A. Compliance
Although the Jacob Wetterling Act appears to require states to include non-
parent kidnapping and false imprisonment of a minor as registrable sexual
offenses,128 the Department of Justice (DOJ) does not enforce the letter of that
provision. While most state legislatures enacted sex offender registries that dutifully
tracked the language of the federal Act, some legislatures refused to include
nonsexual criminals as registrable sex offenders. The Colorado legislature, for
example, simply omitted these offenses from its list, 29 while California and
Delaware required a sexual motivation for any registrable kidnapping or false
imprisonment. 3 ° Nevertheless, all three states have been certified for compliance
by the DOJ. 13' The bureaucrats at the DOJ appear to operate with more common
124 Cintron, 827 N.Y.S.2d at 456.
125 Johnson, 870 N.E.2d at 426.
126 Id. at 424.
127 See, e.g., Gunderson v. Hvass, 339 F.3d 639 (8th Cir. 2003), cert. denied, 510 U.S.
1124 (2004); People v. Woodard, 854 N.E.2d 674 (Ill. App. Ct. 2006); People v. Beard, 851
N.E.2d 141 (Ill. App. Ct. 2006); In re Phillip C., 847 N.E.2d 801 (Ill. App. Ct. 2006); People
v. Fuller, 756 N.E.2d 255 (Ill. App. Ct. 2001); Cintron, 827 N.Y.S.2d at 455; State v.
Sakobie, 598 S.E.2d 615 (N.C. Ct. App. 2004); State v. Bowman, No. 02AP-1025, 2003 WL
22290183 (Ohio Ct. App. Oct. 7, 2003).
128 Compliance with the Act requires registration of criminal offenses that were
"comparable to or which exceed[] the. . . range of offenses" specified in the federal act
including non-parent kidnapping and false imprisonment of a minor. 42 U.S.C.A. §
1407 1(a)(3)(A) (West Supp. 2007). The Act provides that if a state fails to create a registry
within three years of its enactment, the state loses ten percent of its federal crime control
grant funds. Id. § 14071 (g)(1)-(2). The Department of Justice reviews each program and may
grant extensions for good-faith efforts to become compliant. Id.
129 See CoLO. REv. STAT. ANN. § 16-22-102 (West 2006).
130 See CAL. PENAL CODE § 290(2)(A) (West 2007), invalidated by People v. Dulan, 55
Cal. Rptr. 3d 312 (Ct. App. 2007); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 4121(4)(a) (2006).
'31 Telephone Interviews with Department of Justice (various dates).
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sense, and perhaps more sensitivity to constitutional restrictions, than our federal
legislators and some of our courts.
Of course, even if Illinois were obliged to register nonsexual offenders in order
to comply with the federal Act, that would cut no ice insofar as substantive due
process is concerned; but courts' reliance on federal compliance requirements is in any
case misplaced. If anything, the DOJ's certification of states which refuse to register
nonsexual criminals evidences federal recognition that the practice is problematic.
B. The Statistics
More important is the inaccuracy of the statistics cited by the Illinois Supreme
Court. The court notes that one of the sponsors of the Jacob Wetterling Act, U.S.
Senator David Durenberger of Minnesota, 132 declared that "two-thirds of non-family
abductions of minors involved a sexual assault" when he introduced the Act in
Congress:
The reasons for enacting this legislation on the national level are
clear: sexual crimes against children are widespread; the people
who commit these offenses repeat their crimes again and again;
and local law enforcement officials need access to an interstate
system of information to prevent and respond to these horrible
crimes against children. If there is any doubt about the serious-
ness of the problem, consider the following statistics, provided
to me by the National Center for Missing and Exploited Chil-
dren: ChildHelp USA estimates that... [t]wo-thirds of reported
nonfamily child abductions involved sexual assault.
133
These statistics, as also noted by the court in Johnson, were apparently taken from
a 1990 publication entitled National Incidence Studies of Missing, Abducted,
Runaway, and Thrownaway Children in America (NISMART-1), a study conducted
for the DOJ that concluded that "about two-thirds or so of the Non-Family
Abductions involved sexual assaults .... So most of the children were abducted in
conjunction with and in order to facilitate sexual attacks."'' 34 But the study's
132 Senator Durenberger was discussed previously. See supra notes 109-10 and
accompanying text.
'33 137 CONG. REC. S6703 (daily ed. May 23, 1991) (statement of Sen. Durenberger); see
also H.R. REP., No. 103-392 (1993) (referring to a 1990 study by the DOJ finding that two-
thirds of reported non-family abductions involved sexual assault); 139 CONG. REc. S6864
(daily ed. May 28, 1993) (statement of Sen. Durenberger).
134 DAVID FINKELHOR, GERALD HOTALNG, & ANDREA SEDLAK, OFFICE OF JUVENILE
JUSTICE & DELINQUENCY PREVENTION, MISSING, ABDUCTED, RUNAWAY, AND
THROWNAWAY CHILDREN IN AMERICA (1990), available at http://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles 1/
ojjdp/nismart90.pdf [hereinafter NISMART- 1].
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methodology casts serious doubt on the accuracy of this statement, and the data it
used was in any case irrelevant to the case of nonsexual registrants.
The study was based on an examination of police files-which are classified by
crime-and focused on only four crime categories: abduction, homicide, sexual
offenses, and "missing persons" files.'35 All other files were omitted from the study.
The employed methodology had researchers sifting through police files and examin-
ing whether crime reports contained an "abduction."'36 The study was therefore
135 The major challenge for this study was to identify abduction cases in
what were frequently voluminous police records. Unfortunately,
police agencies do not generally keep a separate file in which they
store all cases involving abductions. Many abductions (in the sense
covered by our definition of Legal Definition Abductions) occur in
conjunction with other crimes, such as homicide and rape. Our ex-
ploratory discussions with law enforcement officials, criminologists,
and missing children's advocates, as well as one previous police
records study of child abduction, indicated that four general types of
crime classifications would contain most of the reported cases
involving non-family abductions: abduction, missing persons, homi-
cides and sexual assaults.
Id. at 65-66. A total of 1259 homicide, abduction, and missing persons files from twenty-one
counties were examined. Id. at 69. Three hundred thirteen of 1566 sexual offense files were
studied. Id. at 69. These 313 files were taken from only four counties because the researchers
found sexual offense records to be "very large and heterogeneous" and so decided to limit
the scope of their search and then to multiply the results accordingly. Id. at 68-69.
136 Id. at 24. "Abduction" was defined so as to "correspond[] to the technical crime of
abduction as it is specified in the criminal law of many States." Id.
Under the Legal Definition Abduction type, a Non-Family Abduction
can occur in any one of three ways: 1) coerced taking 2) detainment or
3) luring.... Coerced taking in this definition means a child is taken
by force or threat into a vehicle, into a building, or a substantial
distance (which we set at 20 feet, a distance roughly consistent with
rule established in a California court case).... Detainment: When a
child is unlawfully detained by force or threat for a "substantial period"
in a place of isolation, an abduction also occurs. We set substantial
period at I hour from the time the force or threat is invoked. A place of
isolation refers to any area which the child is not able to leave on his
or her own and from which s/he had no opportunity to appeal for help
or assistance .... Luring: There are abductions where children go
voluntarily with a perpetrator or are so young that voluntariness is
immaterial. One type of abduction by lure recognized by these
definitions is where the perpetrator had the intent at the time of the lure
to physically or sexually assault the child.... Note how this definition
draws a line between two types of "date rape" situations, where a girl
goes off with a boy who later sexually assaults her. If the date had the
intent to assault the girl when he left with her, as might be indicated by
efforts to isolate her, then this would be an abduction.... A second
type of abduction by lure is where the child goes voluntarily but where
520 [Vol. 16:497
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based neither on actual abduction convictions nor on abduction prosecutions and in
most cases not even on a police determination that an abduction occurred.
The study reported that "[m]any short-term abductions that took place in the
course of ... sexual assault were counted."' 3 7 Many indeed: sexual offense files
made up the majority of the files supporting the study's conclusion. According to
the study, "at least 57 to 70 percent of combined Legal Definition Abductions came
from sexual assault files."' 38 The study states that only "20 percent or more of the
[abduction] cases in the abduction, missing person, and homicide files involved
sexual assault."'
139
Given this methodology, the study could not support the registration of non-
parent kidnappers and false imprisoners in sex offender registries: first, the "two-
thirds" figure is not a particularly relevant one, and second, that figure is not
supported by the study's own methodology.
Even if we were willing to equate a researcher's determination that a police file
contained an "abduction" with an actual criminal conviction for the crime of
kidnapping--quite a leap, one might add-the "two-thirds" figure would not be
particularly relevant. The more relevant figure is that of twenty percent- "twenty
percent or more of the [abduction] cases in the abduction, missing person, and
homicide files involved sexual assault '- 4 which excluded the abductions found
in the sexual assault files. This is so because what we are ultimately seeking are
"abductions" unaccompanied by a conviction for a sexual offense or an attempt to
commit a sexual offense-the Jacob Wetterling Act includes attempts as registrable
crimes.' 4' After all, if a defendant is convicted of a sexual offense, he would be
registrable regardless. The question is whether nonsexual abductors not convicted
of either a sexual offense or an attempt to commit one should be made to register.
In other words, the most relevant "abductions" are those involving sexual assaults
that are likely to ensue in an abduction conviction but no conviction for the sexual
assault. Yet the "two-thirds" figure was derived mostly from "abductions" found
in files the police classified as sexual assault files-precisely the sort of "abduc-
tions" that are likely to involve a conviction for a sexual offense and no conviction
for "abduction." Given public sentiment and the heavy penalties accorded sexual
assaults, it is unlikely that the police or the prosecution would forego a sexual
charge and focus exclusively on a nonsexual crime in cases the police classified as
the intent of the perpetrator is to conceal the child, keep the child, or
extort ransom.... [A]n abduction by lure of the second type in this
definition can occur only to children 14 or younger or who are mentally
incompetent.
Id. at 361-63.117 Id. at xiii.
131 Id. at 142.
139 Id.
140 id.
141 42 U.S.C.A. § 1407 1(a)(3)(A)(ix) (West Supp. 2007).
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sexual assaults. This is why, to repeat, the more relevant figure is the twenty percent
figure, which reflects the percentage of abductions involving a sexual offense which
were found outside sexual assault files. Of course, even that number may be highly
inflated compared to the number of actual convictions.
Moreover, that "two-thirds or so of the Non-Family Abductions involved sexual
assaults" is a claim that is incompatible with the study's own methodology.4 2 The
claim cannot be supported by data taken only from a highly limited set of files, as was
done in the study, since it requires an examination of all files which may involve what
the researchers termed "abduction": not only files of sexual assaults, homicide, missing
persons, and kidnapping, but also files of robberies, nonsexual assaults, burglaries,
carjacking, child abuse, drug delivery offenses, etc. Only when the entire universe of
non-family abductions is examined can the percentage of non-family abductions
involving sexual crimes be ascertained. The study made no such examination. 143
To top it off, the sample of sexual offense files, which constituted the bulk of
the data supporting the two-thirds assertion, was too small-according to the
authors' own admission-to generate reliable results: whereas all the other exam-
ined police files were taken from twenty-one counties, the sex offense files were
taken only from four.44 "Thus, estimates based on [the sex offense files]," said the
study, "are of unknown bias and reliability."'' 45
The credibility of the NISMART-1 study was further undermined by the
findings of a follow-up study from 2002, NISMART-2, based on data from 1999
and written by two of the three original authors of the first study. That second study
142 See NISMART-1, supra note 134, at xv.
143 The authors commented that:
[S]ome abductions may have been missed because they occurred in
conjunction with crimes that were not systematically included in this
study. For example, some robberies might also have involved
abductions, but would not have been counted if they were not filed in
the police records in abduction, missing persons, homicide or sexual
assault files. It is possible that as many as 20 percent of abductions may
be filed in such miscellaneous files.
Id. at 70. This twenty percent figure was taken from an earlier study from 1986, An
Evaluation of the Crime of Kidnapping As It Is Committed Against Children by Non-Family
Members, which seemed to have concluded that eighty percent of what the study defined as
"child kidnapping" could be found in those files. Id. at 70 n.24. Whatever the merit of that
earlier study, it dealt with only two counties and employed a different definition of abduction
than the one employed in NISMART-1. Moreover, there was no attempt to take into account
even this twenty percent figure.
'" Id. at 71. ("[W]e should caution about the use of data from the sexual offense files for
making estimates. Due to limitations on resources, these files were only surveyed in 4 of the
21 counties. Thus, estimates based on them are of unknown bias and reliability."). "Because
the records came from only four counties, however, it precluded developing an unbiased
national estimate with known reliability of the number of non-family abductions that get
classified only as sexual offenses." Id. at 68.
145 Id. at 71.
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concluded that close to half of all nonfamily abduction victims (forty-six percent)
were sexually assaulted." s The difference in the estimates of the two studies, from
two-thirds to less than half-which also included a revised estimate of non-family
abductions from a yearly 3200 to 4600 incidents to a whopping 58,200 '4 7 -is signi-
ficant in its own right, for it means that a non-parent kidnapper of a minor is more
likely than not to not be a sex offender. This fact went completely unheeded by the
Illinois Supreme Court, which did mention that second study. 4 But the second
study employed an equally suspicious methodology: NISMART-2 was not even
based on police reports but on random household surveys where alleged victims or
their family members-the majority of which never filed any complaint with the
police-were asked whether an alleged victimization involved an "abduction" as the
study defined it.'
49
Finally, a third study from 2000, entitled NIBRS and written by one of the two co-
authors of both NISMART- 1 and NISMART-2, was based on yet a third methodology
and concluded that "only 15 percent of non-family kidnaping [of minors] (of both
male and female victims) was coded with the additional crime of sexual assault."' 50
146 ANDREA SEDLAK, DAVID FNKELHOR, HEATHER HAMMER, & DANA J. SCHULTZ,
OFFICE OF JUVENILE JUSTICE & DELINQUENCY PREVENTION, NATIONAL INCIDENCE STUDIES
OF MISSING, ABDUCTED, RUNAWAY, AND THROWNAWAY CHILDREN IN AMERICA: NATIONAL
ESTIMATES OF MISSING CHILDREN: AN OVERVIEW 10 (Oct. 2002), available at
http://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffilesl/ojjdp/l196465.pdf [hereinafter NISMART-2]; NISMART
Bulletin: Nonfamily Abducted Children: National Estimates and Characteristics (Oct. 2002),
http://www.ncjrs.gov/html/ojjdp/nismart/03/ns4.html.
14" NISMART-2, supra note 146, at 10 tbl. 7.
148 "The State also directs us to a 2002 Department of Justice study, finding that nearly
half of all nonfamily abductions involve sexual assault." People v. Johnson, 870 N.E.2d 415,
425-26 (Ill. 2007) (citing NISMART-2, supra note 146, at 10).
149 The Household Surveys were conducted during 1999, using computer-
assisted telephone interviewing methodology to collect information...
[from a national] sample of households. A total of 16,111 interviews
were completed with an adult primary caretaker, resulting in an 80-
percent cooperation rate among eligible households with children, and
a 61-percent response rate. The total number of children... [included
in the Household Survey of Adult Caretakers] was 31,787.
NISMART-2, supra note 146, at 2.
Because the new estimate is based on victim accounts rather than
police records, it inherently involves a much lower threshold of
seriousness. Moreover, the definition of nonfamily abduction used in
NISMART-1 involves modest amounts of coerced movement or
detention that are present in many violent and sexual crimes. [T]here
is more imprecision and margin of error in the nonfamily abduction
estimate than in any of the other NISMART-2 estimates.
NISMART Bulletin, Nonfamily Abducted Children: National Estimates and Characteristics
(Oct. 2002), http://www.ncjrs.gov/html/ojjdp/nismart/03/ns5.html.
1SO DAVID FINKELHOR & RICHARD ORMROD, OFFICE OF JUVENILE JUSTICE &
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This third study was also not based on actual abduction convictions or prosecutions,
but it at least had the advantage of being based on police determination of the
implicated crimes. That third study was also mentioned by the Illinois Supreme Court
in Johnson, although oddly enough not for its most relevant and specific finding, but
for the rather vague proposition that "nonfamily kidnaping is generally associated
with other offenses.''
To be fair, the authors of NISMART-1, aware of the stakes involved in their
research, took pains to caution future users of their findings, saying:
People in the heat of partisan passions often feel justified in
using and manipulating statistics however they want, in order to
better support their own prejudices. We recognize that we can-
not control the use to which these numbers are put. But we urge
those who read and use this report to be circumspect and, among
other things, to respect the following recommendations: Do not
pull figures out of context. In presenting the figures, repeat the
cautions and limitations that we mention. Use and specify the
definitions and terminology developed by the study.'52
But their warnings went unheeded. Federal legislators, negligently and apparently
without any serious examination, relied on an irrelevant figure taken from a defective
study given to them by a partisan organization.' 53 That courts then relied on that figure
in rejecting nonsexual registrants' constitutional claims doubles that scandal.'54
As for the constitutional question: in examining the implications of these stat-
istical errors to rational basis review, we must first distinguish between facial and
as applied constitutional challenges. As we shall see, while the more realistic num-
bers cast doubt on the practice's rationality under facial challenges, the registration
of nonsexual criminals is often unconstitutional as applied even if the numbers cited
by Congress and the courts were perfectly correct.
C. Facial v. As Applied Challenges
Two important and interrelated distinctions should be kept in mind when exam-
ining the constitutionality of registering nonsexual criminals under rational basis
review--one a familiar distinction in constitutional law, the other a straightforward
DELINQUENCY PREVENTION, KIDNAPING OF JUVENILES: PATTERNS FROM NIBRS, (June
2000), available at http://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffilesI/ojjdp/l81161.pdf [hereinafter NIBRS].
... Johnson, 870 N.E.2d at 426 (citing NIBRS, supra note 150, at 4).
152 NISMART-1, supra note 134, at 25-26.
,' The study was supplied to Senator Durenberger by the National Center for Missing and
Exploited Children. See 137 CONG. REc. 12,529 (1991) (statement of Sen. Durenberger).
154 See, e.g., Johnson, 870 N.E.2d at 425-26; People v. Cintron, 827 N.Y.S.2d 445, 455
(Sup. Ct. 2006).
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factual one. The first distinction is that between "facial" constitutional challenges
and constitutional challenges "as applied." The distinction-a staple of constitu-
tional doctrine, despite some academic squabbling over its meaning155-revolves
around whether a constitutional claim challenges an entire statutory provision, or
whether it merely asks that an exception be carved out of a statutory provision so as
to exclude the claimant and the class the claimant represents. For example, a
constitutional challenge to a statute criminalizing assisted suicide may seek to
invalidate the entire prohibition on assisted suicide (a facial challenge) or only the
application of the statute to the case of terminally ill patients assisted by their
physicians (an as applied challenge). 56
Nonsexual registrants can advance both facial and as applied challenges. Their
as applied challenges are based on a factual distinction between offenders con-
victed of a nonsexual offense, such as kidnapping of a minor, in which the crime
had a sexual component or motivation, and cases in which there was no such
component or motivation. As applied challenges, therefore, seek to carve an exception
from the registration requirement for those nonsexual criminals whose crimes had
no sexual nexus.
1. Facial Constitutional Challenges
Nonsexual criminals mounting a facial challenge claim that the very inclusion
of nonsexual crimes as registrable offenses is unconstitutional. As we saw, that
inclusion is based on the argument that these crimes often involve a sexual assault; 5 '
but the statistics cited on Congress's floor in support of this claim were essentially
irrelevant and also unsupported by the study's methodology, and later studies indicate
that, if anything, non-parental kidnappings and false imprisonments of a minor are not
likely to be accompanied by a sexual assault.' 58 NIBRS, which was based on police
determination of the involved crimes, claimed that fifteen percent of non-family
abductions involved a sexual crime; 59 and from this number we need to subtract the
estimated number of abductions accompanied by a conviction for an associated sexual
crime. Given these figures, does the registration of these nonsexual offenders "bear
a rational relationship to a legitimate governmental interest?"' 6
The question involves an important principle: what is the point at which the
correlation between kidnapping and sexual assaults is so weak that the registration
"' See, e.g., Matthew D. Adler, Rights Against Rules: The Moral Structure of American
Constitutional Law, 97 MICH. L. REv. 1, 157 (1998); Richard H. Fallon, Jr., As-Applied and
Facial Challenges and Third Party Standing, 113 HARv. L. REV. 1321, 1336-37 (2000).
156 See Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702 (1997) (finding a ban on assisted suicide
did not violate the Fourteenth Amendment facially or as applied).
'57 See supra notes 133-34 and accompanying text.
.5. See supra note 150 and accompanying text.
1 NIBRS, supra note 150, at 6.
See Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 728.
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of nonsexual criminals as sex offenders ceases to be rational? For example, could
a one-percent correlation between kidnappings and sexual assaults support the
registration of kidnappers as sex offenders under rational basis review, or would
such a weak correlation demonstrate that the requirement was arbitrary, derived as
it was from the idiosyncrasies of the Jacob Wetterling tragedy? Substantive due
process claimants challenging the classifications' rationality have adduced proofs
of weak correlations between a legislative classification and the alleged legislative
purpose, but courts have been reluctant to rely on such data. 16' The worry is not
only over the specter of judicial statistics competing with legislative ones-itself no
small concern (especially since courts are not likely to embark on analyses of
statistical studies)-but also over the fact that even a small correlation evidences
some measure of rationality. The question "how much rationality is enough?" may
invite precisely the sort of balancing of interests that the rational basis test is
supposed to avoid.
The facial challenge of nonsexual registrants may fare better under a heightened
rational basis review. As mentioned previously, the Supreme Court has sometimes
engaged in a more exacting form of rational basis review in cases involving
legislation that appears to be based, at least in part, on an animus toward a dis-
favored group.162 The sexual registration of nonsexual criminals is a good candidate
for this more exacting treatment. This heightened review is said to be different from
its commonplace counterpart in that it "look[s] to the record to see if there is in fact
some real correlation between classification and purpose. . . .If the legislature's
factual assumptions about the nexus between classification and purpose are
incorrect, then the standard has not been satisfied."'163 Given that the legislature's
factual assumption that over sixty-six percent of non-parent abductions involved
a sexual offense was incorrect, and that the accurate number appears to be
less-and possibly substantially less-than fifteen percent, the classification should
fail a heightened rational basis review.
Having said all this, a facial invalidation under the rational basis test is not likely
given public sentiments on the matter and the availability of more modest as applied
invalidations. Indeed, all the courts that held the sex offender registration of nonsexual
criminals unconstitutional under the rational basis review grounded their determina-
tion not on the facial unconstitutionality of the challenged statutory provision, but
161 See, e.g., Kraley v. Nat'l Transp. Safety Bd., No. 97-4227, 1998 WL 708705, at *1-3
(6th Cir. Oct. 1, 1998) (upholding a substantive due process challenge to a Federal Aviation
Regulation providing that a motor vehicle action involving drugs or alcohol occurring
within three years of a previous motor vehicle action involving drugs or alcohol is grounds
for the revocation of an airman's "certificate or ratings," based on the claim that there is too
small a correlation between driving while under the influence of alcohol and alcohol-related
flying accidents).
62 See supra notes 104-106 and accompanying text.
163 Farrell, supra note 63, at 360.
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on the unconstitutionality of applying it to the claimant before them."6 Moreover,
as applied invalidations have an advantage from the claimants' perspective in that
their success does not depend on a court's endorsement of this or that statistical
correlation: whatever correlation between certain nonsexual offenses and sexual
assaults exists, no correlation can justify the registration of nonsexual offenders whose
crimes had no sexual nexus.
2. As Applied Constitutional Challenges
Nonsexual registrants advancing as applied substantive due process challenges
ask courts to carve out of the statutory classification the sub-group of nonsexual
offenders whose crimes were devoid of any sexual motivation or component. Thus,
these challenges assert an implied right for a judicial determination of whether the
defendant's nonsexual crime had a sexual nexus: they contain a procedural due
process claim that is based on an alleged substantive due process right. Many courts
dealing with these challenges found it necessary to make such findings: courts sus-
taining as applied challenges often relied on the absence of a sexual nexus, 65 while
those rejecting such challenges often relied on a finding that a sexual nexus existed.'66
D. Judicial Determination of Sexual Nexus and Connecticut Department of
Public Safety v. Doe
The substantive due process basis of these as applied challenges means that a
2003 Supreme Court case, seemingly adverse to judicial determinations of a sexual
nexus, is in fact inapplicable here. Connecticut Department of Public Safety v.
Doe167 upheld Connecticut's Sex Offender Registration Act against a due process
challenge. The plaintiff, who was convicted of a sexual offense, claimed that
registering him as a sex offender violated the Due Process Clause because, while
"6 See State v. Robinson, 873 So. 2d 1205 (Fla. 2004); People v. Johnson, 843 N.E.2d
434 (Ill. App. Ct. 2006), rev'd, 870 N.E.2d 415 (2007); People v. Moi, 801 N.Y.S.2d 780,
2005 WL 1618124, (County Ct. June 3, 2005); State v. Gooden, No. 82621, 2004 WL
1172074 (Ohio Ct. App. May 27, 2004); State v. Barksdale, No. 19294, 2003 WL 77115
(Ohio Ct. App. Jan. 10, 2003); State v. Reine, No. 19157, 2003 WL 77174 (Ohio Ct. App.
Jan. 10, 2003).
165 See, e.g., Robinson, 873 So. 2d 1205; Raines v. State, 805 So. 2d 999 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App. 2001); Johnson, 843 N.E.2d 434; People v. Bell, 778 N.Y.S.2d 837 (Sup. Ct. 2003);
Moi, 2005 WL 1618124; Gooden, 2004 WL 1172074; Barksdale, 2003 WL 77115; Reine,
2003 WL 77174; State v. Washington, No. 99-L-015, 2001 WL 1415568 (Ohio Ct. App.
Nov 2, 2001).
66 See, e.g., State v. Bowman, No. 02AP-1025, 2003 WL 22290183 (Ohio Ct. App. Oct.
7, 2003); State v. McClellan, No. 01AP-1462, 2002 WL 31160074 (Ohio Ct. App. Sept. 30,
2002); State v. Brown, No. 03-1717-CR, 2004 WL 830668 (Wis. Ct. App. Apr. 13, 2004).
167 538 U.S. 1 (2003).
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registration was based on an assumed future dangerousness, he was not dan-
gerous. 1" The district court granted Doe a summary judgment, and the Second
Circuit affirmed, agreeing with the District Court that "a threat to public safety is the
sole avowed and legitimate purpose of the registry," and that, this being the case,
appearing on the registry implied that the registrant was dangerous. 169 Since the
plaintiff claimed that, as to him, that implication was false, the court concluded that he
was entitled to a determination of dangerousness as a matter of procedural due process;
in the absence of such a determination, the registration was unconstitutional. 70
The Supreme Court reversed in a very short opinion with an equally small
rationale:
[T]he fact that respondent seeks to prove-that he is not
currently dangerous-is of no consequence under Connecticut's
Megan's Law. As the DPS Website explains, the law's require-
ments turn on an offender's conviction alone-a fact that a
convicted offender has already had a procedurally safeguarded
opportunity to contest. No other fact is relevant to the disclosure
of registrants' information. ...
In short, even if respondent could prove that he is not likely to
be currently dangerous, Connecticut has decided that the registry
information of all sex offenders--currently dangerous or not-
must be publicly disclosed. Unless respondent can show that
that substantive rule of law is defective (by conflicting with a
provision of the Constitution), any hearing on current danger-
ousness is a bootless exercise. It may be that respondent's claim
is actually a substantive challenge to Connecticut's statute
"recast in 'procedural due process' terms." Nonetheless, re-
spondent expressly disavows any reliance on the substantive
component of the Fourteenth Amendment's protections and main-
tains, as he did below, that his challenge is strictly a procedural
one.... Because the question is not properly before us, we ex-
press no opinion as to whether Connecticut's Megan's Law vio-
lates principles of substantive due process.
Plaintiffs who assert a right to a hearing under the Due Process
Clause must show that the facts they seek to establish in that
'68 Id. at 5-6.
"6 Doe v. Dep't of Pub. Safety, 271 F.3d 38,49 (2d Cir. 2001), rev'd, 538 U.S. 1 (2003).
270 Id. at 50.
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hearing are relevant under the statutory scheme. Respondent
cannot make that showing here. 7 '
Sex offender registration statutes generally do not consider sexual nexus relevant to
a determination of registrability either. But Connecticut Department of Public Safety
v. Doe does not govern the claim of nonsexual registrants for a determination of a
sexual nexus because, as quoted above, that decision made clear-as did the two
concurring opinions in the case 7 2M-that it was based on the absence of any im-
plicated substantive due process claim. By contrast, the claim for a determination
of sexual nexus in the case of nonsexual registrants is squarely based on substantive
due process grounds.
Perhaps more importantly, although the decision was based on the statute's
omission of any reference to "dangerousness" as a criterion for registration, this
reasoning is inaccurate and should not be taken too literally. The opinion was writ-
ten by then-Chief Justice Rehnquist, not the most clear-eyed of opinion-writers.173
Procedural due process precedents have recognized rights to judicial determinations
of fact that are not required by the challenged statute. In Bell v. Burson, 17 4 for
example, the Court invalidated a part of Georgia's Motor Vehicle Safety Responsi-
bility Act, which required that the motor vehicle registration and driver's license of
an uninsured motorist involved in an accident be suspended unless the driver posted
security to cover the amount of damages claimed by aggrieved parties.' 5 The
statute did not provide for any pre-suspension determination of the motorist's fault
for the accident.'76 The Georgia Court of Appeals, in a reasoning very similar to the
one employed by Justice Rehnquist in Doe, rejected the claim that the defendant was
entitled to such a determination.'77 The Supreme Court reversed:
The Georgia Court of Appeals rejected petitioner's contention
that the State's statutory scheme, in failing before suspending
the licenses to afford him a hearing on the question of his fault
or liability, denied him due process in violation of the Four-
teenth Amendment: the court held that "'Fault' or 'innocence'
are completely irrelevant factors. . . ." The Georgia Supreme
Court denied review. We reverse.
' Doe, 538 U.S. at 7-8 (citations omitted).
.7. Id. at 8-10 (Scalia, J., concurring) (Souter, J., concurring).
'"' Id. at 1 (majority opinion).
114 402 U.S. 535 (1971).
'.. Motor Vehicle Safety Responsibility Act, GA. CODE ANN. § 92A-601 (1958), cited in
Bell, 402 U.S. at 536 n.l.
176 Bell, 402 U.S. at 536.
17' Burson v. Bell, 174 S.E.2d 235, 236 (Ga. Ct. App. 1970).
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Suspension of issued licenses thus involves state action that
adjudicates important interests of the licensees. In such cases the
licenses are not to be taken away without that procedural due
process required by the Fourteenth Amendment.
78
There are other examples, including the invalidation of a statute declaring the
children of unmarried fathers "state wardens" upon the death of the mother without
judicial determination of the father's parental unfitness and statutes authorizing the
pre-judgment seizure of leased property without requiring judicial determination
that the property might be wrongfully held. 179 The Supreme Court invalidated these
statutes as violations of procedural due process without bothering to examine
whether substantive due process rights were also involved. Of course, if we took
Doe literally, these statutes would be perfectly constitutional insofar as procedural
due process is concerned, because "the fact that respondent seeks to prove"-be it
a non-insured driver's lack of fault in the accident, an unmarried father's parental
fitness, or a lessee's rightful possession-"is of no consequence under" the chal-
lenged statutory scheme.I80 That result is both inconsistent with precedent-a fact
the Doe Court apparently did not realize-and makes little sense: statutes may vio-
late procedural due process by presuming, unjustifiably, the existence of facts (the
fault of the uninsured driver, the parental unfitness of the unmarried father, the
wrongful possession of leased property, the sexual nature of an offender's crime)
without allowing for their judicial determination.
Thus, that the Connecticut statute failed to provide a determination of danger-
ousness should have been the beginning of the inquiry, not its end. The real ques-
tion in Doe was whether the registration of the claimant unjustifiably presumed his
dangerousness in violation of procedural due process. If it did-and assuming, as
we should, that sex offender registration deprives registrants of a constitutionally
cognizant interest in liberty"'8 '-and if registrants nevertheless were not afforded an
opportunity to be heard on the matter, then the statute could have violated pro-
cedural due process. Indeed, that sex offender registration presumed a determi-
nation of dangerousness was the basis for both the District Court's and the Second
Circuit's invalidation of the statute. 2 The better reading of the Supreme Court
178 Burson, 402 U.S. at 536-537, 539.
17' See Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645 (1972) (holding that an Illinois statutory scheme
declaring the children of unmarried fathers state wardens upon the death of the mother
violated procedural due process because it failed to provide unmarried fathers a judicial
determination of parental fitness); Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67 (1972) (holding that
Florida and Pennsylvania statutes authorizing seizure of property violated procedural due
process because they failed to require a judicial determination that the property was in fact
wrongfully held).
"o Conn. Dep't of Pub. Safety v. Doe, 538 U.S. 1, 7 (2003).
I8I See supra note 84 and accompanying text.
182 See Doe v. Dep't of Pub. Safety, 271 F.3d 38,49 (2d Cir. 2001), rev'd, 538 U.S. 1 (2003).
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decision in Doe is therefore this: either Connecticut's sex offender registration did
not presume dangerousness (dangerousness was simply not a necessary assumption
of sex offender registration), or if it did, the presumption of dangerousness was justi-
fied by the mere fact of conviction for a registrable offense.
Applying this more sensible interpretation of Doe to the case of nonsexual
registrants seeking a determination of sexual nexus, it is clear that Doe does not
stand in the way of that claim. Unlike dangerousness, there is little doubt that sex
offender registration presumes the sexual nature of the defendant's crime, and it is
equally clear that the assumed sexual nature of the crime could not justifiably derive
from the mere conviction for a nonsexual offense. Thus, even if Connecticut
Department of Public Safety v. Doe were applicable to the claims of nonsexual
defendants-which it is not due to the substantive due process nature of their
claims-it would still pose no obstacles to nonsexual criminals' claims for a judicial
determination of sexual nexus.
E. As Applied Challenges and Rational Basis Review
Nonsexual registrants advancing as applied challenges claim that sex offender
registration of nonsexual criminals whose crime had no sexual nexus fails even the
deferential rational basis review: there is no rational relationship between the regi-
stration of such nonsexual criminals and the purpose of sex offender registries-viz.,
the prevention of future crime by recidivist sex offenders, and their quick appre-
hension if they reoffend. As we saw, the registration of nonsexual criminals as sex
offenders has been justified on the ground that their crimes are likely to have a
sexual nexus;1 83 where it has been determined that no such sexual nexus existed,
there is no rational basis for the registration. A judicial determination that a claimant's
nonsexual crime lacked sexual nexus should therefore render his registration as a sex
offender unconstitutional. Indeed, no court rejecting the constitutional challenge of
nonsexual offenders did so after finding an absence of sexual nexus:1 apparently
that would have been too preposterous.
One argument worth mentioning appeared in a case in which Florida opposed
an as applied challenge, claiming that the "legislature rationally could have con-
cluded that the difficulty in confirming whether an abducted child has been sexually
exploited... [due to the victim's young age, her fear, or even her lack of awareness
that such a crime had occurred] justifies the inclusion of all persons convicted of
kidnapping.., of a minor not their child."'85 Accordingly, sex offender registration of
nonsexual criminals should not be conditioned on judicial determinations of a sexual
nexus because it may be too difficult to determine whether a sexual nexus existed.
First, there is no good reason to believe that such determinations are particularly
difficult: the prosecution did not find it too difficult to concede the lack of sexual
83 See supra notes 134-35 and accompanying text.
184 See supra note 166 and accompanying text.
185 State v. Robinson, 873 So. 2d 1205, 1215 (Fla. 2004).
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nexus in a number of cases, and courts have been making such determinations
regularly. 186 Second, there is little that is "rational" in registering nonsexual crimi-
nals as sex offenders simply because determinations of sexual nexus may be "diffi-
cult": such arguments prove too much, and the rationality required by rational basis
review would be reduced to an empty shell if satisfied by them. More importantly,
the claim that the government may name nonsexual criminals sex offenders and im-
pose on them onerous and potentially ruinous registration requirements because it
may be "difficult" to determine whether there was a sexual nexus to their crime, is
a preposterous reversal of the values found in our due process jurisprudence.
Factual uncertainties are a fact of life in legal disputes, especially those involving
criminal conduct; and to claim that these uncertainties allow the government to
simply assume a sexual nexus is argumentation run amok. The Supreme Court re-
sponded to an analogous argument, made in the context of a statute presuming the
continuing non-residency of out-of-state public university students, by rejecting as
violating due process what it called "procedure by presumption."' 7 The constitu-
tional violation is even clearer when the presumption results not in higher university
fees but in ruinous life-altering sex offender registration.
F. The Process that Is Due
There still remains the question of how much process is due in judicial
determinations of sexual nexus. Although many of the courts who made such deter-
minations simply announced their findings unceremoniously and without discussing
the burden of proof, the matter is in fact governed by the Due Process Clause.
Mathews v. Eldridge,188 which dealt with the termination of disability benefits,
provides one often-used framework for evaluating the appropriate burden of proof:
[I]dentification of the specific dictates of due process generally
requires consideration of three distinct factors: First, the private
interest that will be affected by the official action; second, the
risk of an erroneous deprivation of such interest through the
procedures used, and the probable value, if any, of additional or
substitute procedural safeguards; and finally, the Government's
interest, including the function involved and the fiscal and
administrative burdens that the additional or substitute proce-
dural requirement would entail. 8 9
186 See, e.g., State v. Barksdale, No. 19294, 2003 WL 77115, at *1 (Ohio Ct. App. Jan.
10, 2003); State v. Reine, No. 19157, 2003 WL 77174, at *1 (Ohio Ct. App. Jan. 10, 2003).
181 "Procedure by presumption is always cheaper and easier than individualized
determination. But when, as here, the procedure forecloses the determinative issues.... [it]
cannot stand." Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 656-57 (1972).
188 424 U.S. 319 (1976).
89 Id. at 335. The Mathews framework has been used in the criminal context. See, e.g.,
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While the test allows substantial latitude, it seems reasonable to assume, given the
enormous stakes involved for potential registrants, that the government must shoulder
a considerable burden of proof.1 °
VI. CONSTITUTIONAL REMEDIES AND CONCLUSION
The registration of nonsexual criminals in sex offender registries, absent a deter-
mination of a sexual nexus, violates the Due Process Clause. And this means not
only that the states implementing these registration requirements are violating the
Constitution, but that the federal government is too: the Jacob Wetterling Act posits
conditions to the allocation of federal funds, and Congress's spending power cannot
be constitutionally used so as to induce constitutional violations. 9 '
What are the alternatives for remedying this unconstitutional practice? The
most obvious remedy is to require a finding of a sexual nexus for any registrable
nonsexual crime. As we saw, some state legislatures, like those of California and
Delaware, wisely required a sexual nexus from the start.' 92 Some courts similarly
required-sometimes explicitly, often implicitly-such judicial findings, and in
some instances matching legislation has followed these judicial pronouncements. 93
But a few states, similarly reluctant to call nonsexual offenders sexual criminals,
have chosen a different route: they either established separate registries for sexual and
nonsexual offenders, or omitted the designation "sexual" from the registry's title
while identifying the sex offenders as such individually. Hawaii, for example, has
established two separate registries-one entitled "Sex Offender Registry" and the
other "Offender Against Minor Registry."' 94 Louisiana's registry is entitled "State
Sex Offender and Child Predator Registry."' 95  Kansas has a registry entitled
Ake v. Oklahoma, 470 U.S. 68 (1985); United States v. Raddatz, 447 U.S. 667 (1980). The
Court has retreated from the use of Mathews in evaluating state procedural due process
rules in the criminal context due to federalist concerns. See Medina v. California, 505 U.S.
437, 442-43 (1992). But the test still widely informs the determinations of state courts. See
Britton v. Rogers, 631 F.2d 572, 580 (8th Cir. 1980).
1"' For a case addressing the issue and reaching a different conclusion, see State v. Pierce,
794 A.2d 1123, 1129 (Conn. App. Ct. 2002) ("[T]he court's finding of a sexual purpose
requires a hearing with the quantum of proof being a fair preponderance of the evidence. The
hearing must afford the defendant an opportunity to present evidence to show that he did not
commit the crime for a sexual purpose."), rev'd on other grounds, 849 A.2d 375 (Conn.
2004).
'.' Cf. South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203, 210-11 (1987).
192 See supra note 130 and accompanying text.
'9 See, e.g., S.B. 318, 126th Gen. Assem., Reg. Sess. (Ohio 2005-2006).
4 Hawaii Criminal Justice Data Center, Sex Offender and Offender Against Minors
Information, http://sexoffenders.ehawaii.gov/sexoff/search.jsp (last visited Sept. 22, 2007).
9 Louisiana State Police, State Sex Offender and Child Predator Registry, http://
lasocprl.lsp.org (last visited Sept. 22, 2007).
2007]
WILLIAM & MARY BILL OF RIGHTS JOURNAL
"Registered Offenders," which identifies only those convicted of sex crimes as sexual
criminals,' 96 while Minnesota's list is entitled "Predatory Offender Registry.' 97 The
Washington statute establishing Washington's registry is entitled "sex offenders
and kidnapping offenders-Release of information to public-Web Site."'198
But these seemingly facile solutions run into constitutional difficulties of their
own. First, many of these attempts to separate sexual from nonsexual offenders do
a miserable job at it, thereby failing to eliminate the unconstitutional infirmity. For
example, Washington's official offender registration website, which purports to
distinguish between sex offenders and kidnappers of minors, is entitled "Washing-
ton State Sexual Offender Information Center."' 99 Louisiana's registry is entitled
"State Sex Offender and Child Predator Registry," but both sex offenders and non-
sexual offenders appear together on the same page and can be distinguished only by
an examination of the specific offense for which an offender is registered (which
requires going beyond the initial list of offenders, and then beyond an individual
presentation which includes, among other things, the offender's picture, address, and
employer).2°° Given the high likelihood that nonsexual offenders be taken for sex-
ual ones, such half-measures should not pass constitutional muster.
But the problems go deeper. The registration of non-parent kidnappers and false
imprisoners of minors in differently titled registries may run afoul of the Equal
Protection Clause, which requires that all those similarly situated be treated alike.2"'
The registration of sex offenders-as opposed to all other criminals-is based on the
claim of high recidivism rates; but what is the basis for registering some nonsexual
criminals victimizing minors-whose crime had no sexual nexus-while failing to
register others? What can justify the difference in the treatment of kidnappers and
false imprisoners of minors as opposed to murderers, abusers, robbers, or assaulters
of minors? The government is of course not barred from imposing registration re-
quirement on some criminals but not on others: registering only sex offenders is
certainly constitutional, and so is Montana's registration of violent offenders, 2°2 or
West Virginia's and Connecticut's registration of sex offenders and nonsexual
196 See KAN. STAT. ANN. § 22-4909 (2007).
197 Minnesota Predatory Offender Registry, http://por.state.mn.us (last visited Sept. 22, 2007).
'9' See WASH. REV. CODE 4.24.550 (2007).
'99 See The Washington State Sex Offender Information Center, http://ml.waspc.org (last
visited Sept. 22, 2007). From this webpage one proceeds to another one which informs the
viewer, who cares to read the information instead of simply progressing to the search page,
that "The Washington State Registered Sex Offender Law [was] amended to include
kidnapping offenders in the registration program"; it then allows the viewer to press an icon
which reads "click here to search for registered sex offenders." The site was established and
is maintained by the Washington association of sheriffs and police chiefs, in accordance with
Washington's sex offender registration statute. See WASH. REV. CODE 4.24.550(5)(a) (2007).
200 See Louisiana State Police, supra note 195.
201 See Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 541-42 (1942).
202 Sexual or Violent Offender Registry, http://www.doj.mt.gov/svor/default.asp (last
visited Sept. 29, 2007).
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offenders whose crimes had a sexual nexus.203 Registering all offenders against child-
ren is also perfectly constitutional. But all these differentiations have some rational
basis, while in the case of nonsexual kidnappers and false imprisoners, there seems
to be none: singling out these crimes for sex offender registration has more to do
with the peculiarities of the Jacob Wetterling tragedy than with a rationally-
grounded distinction.
There are still more difficulties. Allowing the registration of purely nonsexual
criminals casts doubt on the constitutionality of the retroactive application of regi-
stration requirements.2°4 In Smith v. Doe,20 5 the Supreme Court, reversing a decision
by the Ninth Circuit, upheld the retroactive application of Alaska's Sex Offender
Registration Act on the ground that sex offender registration was a civil, non-
punitive regulatory scheme. 206 (The Ex Post Facto Clause's prohibition on retro-
active application applies only to criminal punishments).207 Although Alaska's regi-
stration provisions were codified in the State's Code of Criminal Procedure, and
although the Act imposed burdens seemingly unnecessary to fulfill its preventive
and law enforcement purposes, the Supreme Court nevertheless determined that the
legislature intended the registration as a civil measure.08 Concerns over recidivism
among sex offenders lay at the heart of that determination:
The [Alaska] legislature found that "sex offenders pose a high
risk of reoffending," and identified "protecting the public from
sex offenders" as the "primary governmental interest" of the
law. .. . Alaska could conclude that a conviction for a sex
offense provides evidence of substantial risk of recidivism. The
203 See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 54-254(a) (West 2007) ("Any person who has
been convicted.. . in this state on or after October 1, 1998, of any felony that the court finds
was committed for a sexual purpose, may be required by the court upon release into the
community... to register such person's name, identifying factors, criminal history record
and residence address with the Commissioner of Public Safety, on such forms and in such
locations as the commissioner shall direct, and to maintain such registration for ten years.");
W. VA. CODE ANN., § 15-12-2(c), (j) (West 2007) ("Any person who has been convicted of
a criminal offense and the sentencing judge made a written finding that the offense was
sexually motivated shall also register as set forth in this article.... () For purposes of this
article, the term 'sexually motivated' means that one of the purposes for which a person
committed the crime was for any person's sexual gratification.").
204 The retroactive application of sex offender registration and notification requirements
has been challenged in many jurisdictions. See Carol Schultz Vento, Annotation, Validity,
Construction, and Application of State Statutes Authorizing Community Notification of
Release of Convicted Sex Offender, 78 A.L.R. 5th 489 (2000).
205 538 U.S. 84 (2003).
206 See id. The decision employed the test developed in Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez,
372 U.S. 144 (1963). Smith, 538 U.S. at 97.
207 See Calder v. Bull, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 386 (1798).
208 Smith, 538 U.S. at 85.
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legislature's findings are consistent with grave concerns over the
high rate of recidivism among convicted sex offenders and their
dangerousness as a class. The risk of recidivism posed by sex
offenders is "frightening and high."... Empirical research on
child molesters.., has shown that, "[c]ontrary to conventional
wisdom, most reoffenses do not occur within the first several
years after release," but may occur "as late as 20 years following
release."... [R]ecidivism is the statutory concern.29
All this reasoning is, of course, inapplicable to nonsexual offenders-a point lost on
some courts that rejected the ex post facto challenges of nonsexual registrants by
relying on Smith.2"' Once registration is expanded beyond sexual crimes, the question
of retroactive application is no longer settled.
The Constitution protects from governmental overreaching not only the law-
abiding citizen, but also the criminal-who may often be in an even greater need of
protection. Indeed, some constitutional provisions-the Eighth Amendment's Cruel
and Unusual Punishment Clause or the Fifth Amendment's Double Jeopardy
Clause-are specifically designed to protect those convicted of crimes."' Register-
ing nonsexual criminals whose crimes lack a sexual nexus as sex offenders is an
arbitrary, oppressive, and unjustified government action that is forbidden by the Due
Process Clause. It is also an obnoxious demonstration of what little justification
may suffice to override criminals' most basic rights. Flawed statistics, the absence
of any serious legislative debate, and facile judicial reasoning combine to perpetuate
this patently unconstitutional practice in a large number of jurisdictions. Given the
enormous personal cost to those registered in sex offender registries, as well as the
raison d'etre for sex offender registration, requiring a showing of sexual nexus is not
only the most straightforward remedy of this constitutional violation-it is also the
most decent one.
209 Id. at 93, 103-105 (citations omitted). The Ninth Circuit relied on the fact that no
determination of dangerousness was required to conclude that the Act imposed a criminal
punishment. See Doe I v. Otte, 259 F.3d 979 (9th Cir. 2001), rev'd, 538 U.S. 84 (2003).
210 See, e.g., People v. Cintron, 827 N.Y.S.2d 445 (Sup. Ct. 2006); State v. Sakobie, 598
S.E.2d 615 (N.C. Ct. App. 2004).
2' See U.S. CONST. amend. VIII; id. amend. V.
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